State Intervention Opposition Fallacy

In some recent political conversation’s I’ve had with friends and strangers, I’ve come across a fallacious argument that’s so common that it deserves a name. I’ve already done a little re-search if there’s a term for this fallacy but have failed to find anything. The argument in short, is that one’s opposition to a governmental policy is to be against the intentions of the policy or it’s founders. Here are a few examples of this fallacy.

Charles: I agree with Obama that we ought to double our foreign aid to poor nations.

David: Yes, I hear that’s something he intends on doing, I don’t agree with him on that though.

Charles: I don’t get it, why are you opposed to that? Are you against helping poor nations? Don’t you think poor people should have food?

or

Charles: You know, obesity is a big problem, which is why I’m happy they passed a “trans fat” ban here in California.

David: I’m not happy at all, I don’t feel comfortable with the government regulating whether or not I can eat fatty foods.
Charles: …but don’t you want people have a healthier diet? Do you approve of people getting overweight?

The reasoning that motivates the questions asked by Charles is that David’s opposition to a governmental policy is to be against the intentions of the policy or its founders. What’s wrong with this? The error is that what is in question is not the intentions but the methods. The question on whether or governmental policy is just and should be supported is not solely determined by the intentions of the policy, but other considerations. Will the policy achieve its objective? Are there superior forms of that policy that will achieve the objective more efficiently? Does the government have the legal or constitutional right to do what is in question? Does the policy strip rights away from others? These are just a few important considerations that should determine whether a policy should be supported or exist at all.

I’m going to call this fallacy the “State Intervention Opposition Fallacy,” since the reasoning behind it is always in response to someone’s opposition to the state’s intervention.

Let’s consider the case of foreign aid. It’s obvious that the intentions of foreign aid are in part to help poor nations, if so why oppose it? For starters you could argue that giving poor nations food does address why they are poor in the first place but instead gives temporary assistance. Second, it’s clear that it’s unconstitutional and illegal. Here are some quotes by our founders and other political leaders:

" The government of the United States is a definite government, confined to specified objects. It is not like state governments, whose powers are more general. Charity is no part of the legislative duty of the government.”

-- James Madison, speech in the House of Representatives, January 10, 1794

"I cannot find any authority in the Constitution for public charity. [To approve the measure] would be contrary to the letter and spirit of the Constitution and subversive to the whole theory upon which the Union of these States is founded."

-- President Franklin Pierce's 1854

"I cannot undertake to lay my finger on that article of the Constitution which granted a right to Congress of expending, on objects of benevolence, the money of their constituents."

-- James Madison, 4 Annals of congress 179 (1794)

Third, there’s data out there (I don’t have on hand) that suggest the amount of money given by American’s voluntarily is much higher than given by our government in the form of tax dollars, therefore rending idea of foreign aid unnecessary. These are all legitimate reasons to oppose foreign aid, and none of them require that you hate poor people.

Stupid things people say during debate.

Close to four years ago, I bought a digital voice recorder that I used to record interesting discussions I had with people about controversial topics. I recently took a look at the number of hours I had recorded back then, and it's a little over 35 hours of recordings. I have since stopped recording conversations and can only speculate how many hours it would be if I had a voice recorder my entire life. As I listened through old conversations, I notice themes on what people say and how they respond to different things.

On occasion I'll get into conversations with people who I personally categories as "non-philosophers" or "misologists." Of course this is a harsh thing to be called, but let me explain what I mean when I say this and how I personally identify them.

By "non-philosopher" I don't mean someone who is not a professor or student of philosophy, but rather someone who, by his own statements, reveals his ignorance of logical fallacies or errors in reasoning. By 'ignorance of logical fallacies' I don't mean ignorance of what "ad hominem" is or what a "compositional fallacy" is, but rather does not see them as fallacies. You don't actually have to know what term is used to identify a fallacy to know it's a fallacy.

By "misologists" I mean someone who, by his own statements, reveals a hatred of reasoning altogether. Of course this may not be conscious, but known by what they say.

Obviously all of this might be seen as very condescending of me, but frankly I don't care about that very much.

Here are small lists of 4 highly obnoxious themes found in too many discussions/debates I've had over the years. Anyone who says, or argues, one of these I personally consider a misologists or a non-philosopher.

1. "That's never going to happen"

Often in discussions of politics or philosophy the objection is that a hypothetical situation or thought experiment is not valid or worth considering because it "will never happen." This objection usually will come up when a thought experiment involves wildly bizarre or unlikely circumstances. Here's a small fictional account of what this looks like.

John: David, you see I believe in a kind of democracy where the will of the people rule, and if the will of the people is served that is just.David: All right, but don't you feel that some things are not up to a vote?

John: What do you mean?

David: Well, are you saying that if the great majority of the people voted to kill you, that would be just?

John: That's ridiculous! That's never going to happen.

David: Fine, but if you're position is that it's just for the will of the people to be served, and the people will your death, wouldn't that be just under your view?

John: David, that's just never going to happen.

This objection can only be made by someone who simply does not understand what a thought experiment is and what purpose it fulfills. A thought experiment is a proposal for an experiment that would test a hypothesis or theory but cannot actually be performed due to practical limitations; instead its purpose is to explore the potential consequences of the principle in question. In the case of John's position on democracy and justice, his principle was that it is just if it is the will of the people. If his principle is true and going to be held consistently then the consequence of that would be that it can be just to kill an innocent man. The fact that the circumstances in the hypothetical are bizarre or unlikely is completely irrelevant as to whether or not the principle is true.

One thing to point out is that the essence of all thinking involves considering hypothetical situations - most of which will never occur. Consider for a moment what it actually means to think about something. For example, thinking about whether to go camping in the woods or to the beach. When think about each option, you imagine the circumstances (i.e. the weather and things you may do). In essence you're playing with hypothetical situations in your mind. So it seems that to reject the use of a thought experiment on the grounds that it's "hypothetical" or "never going to happen" is really to reject the idea of thinking altogether, and to reject the idea of thinking altogether amounts to a hatred of reason and philosophy.

2. "Debating this topic is pointless since nobody will change their mind"

Often you'll find that some people will avoid discussing topics of importance or controversy on the grounds that debating it is pointless or not constructive since it's unlikely that either side will change their mind after the discussion. This defense can be found in many forms:

1. Why debate? It's not like you're going to convince him of anything he doesn't believe
2. I have my beliefs, you have yours, and we're not going to convince each

other of anything, so why bother?

I first want to point out that this presupposes that the purpose of debate is to convince your opponent that he is wrong. This is not at all obvious, and you could argue that the purpose or one of the purposes of debate is to test your ideas against others, or to convince an audience member. The truth is that the purpose of debating probably relies on the intention of the debaters, and is not some kind of defined thing.

Second, this seems to suggest that if a debate does not result in someone being convinced then it was not worth having. The notion that a debate is not worth having, or has little to no value if others are not convinced is just false. One can debate for enjoyment, to test his ideas against others, for the audience, or simply because he feels it's important. This objection could be used to argue why the presidential debates are pointless and are not worth having since both parties usually have strong convictions about what is best for the nation.

Third, whether or not someone is convinced immediately after the debate does not mean they will not eventually be convinced. I personally have had many beliefs and ideas of mine changed as the result of debates I had months before, and I probably would have never changed my position on those things if I had not engaged in debate with others. The truth is that false ideas are best exposed by testing them against other ideas in debate. As David Hume said, "Truth springs from argument among friends."

3. "That's just your opinion"

Another common reason people give to justify why it's not worth their time to discuss important or controversial topics is to brush off the discussion as simply "your opinion against mine." The idea is that debating whether or not there ought to be a minimum wage or whether god exists is like debating which ice cream is best; it at the end of the day is just a "matter of opinion."

Opinion - a belief or judgment that rests on grounds insufficient to produce complete certainty

There are three things to say about this. First, pointing out that someone's belief is a matter of opinion is uttering something meaningless since the definition of opinion is almost synonymous with 'belief.' It's like dismissing someone's argument on the grounds that "It's just a bunch of words put together."

Second, what is relevant in debating an issue is not whether or not something is an opinion but the level of evidence or justification for that opinion. Opinions are not all created equal, some may be supported by better reasons.

Third, there are many things that are considered knowledge today that were once opinion: the shape of the earth, the cause of lightning, and what causes illness are a few examples. The shape of the earth, and its position in the universe was at one time a theological issue debated amongst religious people. You could have easily dismissed debating the position of the earth's place in the universe as a "matter of opinion" or "your religious beliefs against mine." The fact that something happens to be an opinion currently has no relevance on whether it may be knowledge in the future, and it's through debating different positions that we can come to understand something is knowledge. So ultimately refusing to take part in a discussion of 'opinions' is refusing in discussing the truth, and refusing to discuss the truth amounts to a rejection of philosophy altogether.

4. "Pressing your beliefs on others"

Some object to debating topics of importance or controversy on the grounds that it's somehow rude or immoral to "press your beliefs on others." The idea is that provided an argument on why something is true amounts to trying to "convert someone" or "cram your beliefs down their throat" and those are both bad things to do.

First, a belief is either true or false. This is a rather simple premise, and is hard to find anyone who disagrees. A belief or set of beliefs can be reduced to statements about the world. When one says "I believe the basket ball is in the closet" one is claiming to belief the statement "the basket ball is in the closet" is true. The statement is true if it corresponds to reality, which is to say, such a statement about the world is true if it 'maps on' to the real world.

There are some though, and they are not hard to find, who will object saying "Those beliefs are true to them" or "We're all right in our own way" and often resort to the Elephant in the room story. In various versions of the tale, a group of blind men (or men in the dark) touch an elephant to try and discover what it is. Each one touches a different part, but only one part, such as the side or the tusk. They then compare notes on what they felt, and learn they are in complete disagreement. The story is used to indicate that reality may be viewed differently depending upon one's perspective. Each blind man says "It's a rope!" or "It's a wall!" the story ends as follows:

"They began to argue about the elephant and everyone of them insisted that he was right. It looked like they were getting agitated. A wise man was passing by and he saw this. He stopped and asked them, "What is the matter?" They said, "We cannot agree to what the thing we're touching is." Each one of them told what he thought it was. The wise man calmly explained to them, "All of you are right. The reason every one of you is telling it differently because each one of you touched the different part. So, actually the elephant has all those features what you all said."

If you find yourself in a conversation on religion with a liberal minded person, you will hear this story many times. It's the "We're all right in our own way" kind of mentality that is more of a preschool "We're all winners!" type of thinking. One blatant flaw in the story is, although each one felt a different part of the same "truth" - they were all wrong! It was NOT a rope, a wall, a tree, it was an Elephant! Each man made false statements about the world, namely that the object they were touching was something other than an Elephant.

2. Holding true beliefs is better than holding false ones.

(one is better off holding true beliefs)

Beliefs translate into actions, and actions effect people. If those beliefs are false, you're almost certainly wasting a lot of time. Consider the belief that the gods require a child sacrifice in exchange for rain this month. If such a belief is true, then it may be justified, if however that belief is false, you're simply killing an innocent child. What people believe matters; it matters only because of the potentially wasteful or harmful implications of those beliefs being false.

3. Helping people in ways that is better for them is good.

If people are better off holding true beliefs, and helping people in ways that is better for them is good, then it follows that helping people hold true beliefs is good. Of course, helping people hold true beliefs can only be done by providing good reasons and argument, which is precisely what 'converting someone' ultimately is. If you agree with premise 1, 2, and 3 you simply can not condemn or criticize someone for making attempts to 'convert the lost.'

Another thing to point out about this defense is not only immoral and cold hearted, but self-refuting. To better understand how this is the case, we must turn to the actual definition for 'convert.'

convert. (v)

1) To change (something) into a different form or properties.

2) To persuade or induce to adopt a particular religion, faith, or belief.

The second definition given is more appropriate given the context. To convert someone is to persuade them into believing whatever proposition is being presented.

persuade. (v)

1) To induce to undertake a course of action or embrace a point of view by means of argument, reasoning, or entreaty.

To be more specific, to 'convert' someone is to persuade them by means of argument and reason. So if you grant the definition of convert, or persuade, any instance where someone attempts to convince someone of a proposition by means of reason or argument is by definition attempting to convert that person. Therefore the very act of telling someone they are rude for attempting to convert others, if followed by reasons like "I think you should not do this for reason X" is by definition an act of persuasion which is what converting someone is! So to convince one that converting others is rude is in itself a form of conversion! The entire complaint is self-refuting.

By: David Campbell
Originally written: 2007

Economic Facts & Fallacies

 

1. PROVING THE CLAIM

TAXES REDUCE INCENTIVES

1. The primary incentive to do X is money.
2. If the amount of money increases then the incentive increases.
3. If the amount of money is decreased then the incentive decreases.
4. Therefore the amount of money offered corresponds to the incentive.

Example in practice

Imagine I offer you $100 to mow my lawn. You mow my lawn. Imagine I offer you $200 the next day to mow my lawn. Would your incentive to mow my lawn increase? Would you be willing to sacrifice more perhaps? (Not go to the movies for example). Imagine I offer you $20. Would your incentive to mow my lawn decrease?

This seems like a trivial and almost obvious point. The answer to all those questions is yes. In a way it's simply describing supply and demand. Of course if all things obviously true were believed, I would not need to write such things as this.

If you accept the premises above and answered yes to the questions in the thought experiment, then it's fair to say that we've established the amount of money offered corresponds to the incentive to do X.

Tax - A charge against a citizen's person or property or activity for the support of government.

A tax basically is forced 'fee' or 'charge' on something. If I were to pay a 50% tax on $100, I would be left with $50. Taxation therefore reduces the value of whatever is being taxed.

Example in practice

Imagine I offer you $100 to mow my lawn. You mow my lawn. Now imagine I offer you $100 to mow my lawn, and the government recently imposed a tax on mowing lawns, the tax is set to 50%. I offer you $100, but you only receive $50. Would you incentive to mow my lawn change?

Again, all of this is quite obvious. The answer is yes. Economically, there's no difference to you whether or not he offers you $100 or $200, what you will actually receive matters. By the same reasoning, economically it makes no difference to the man how much you get, what he actually pays matters.

If you accept the premises above and answered yes to the questions in the thought experiment, then it's fair to say that we've established if the amount of money offered corresponds to the incentive to do X, and if taxation results in the amount of money being offered always being lower, then it's reasonable to conclude that taxes always reduce the incentive to do X.

In summery

5. The primary incentive to do X is money.
6. If the amount of money increases then the incentive increases.
7. If the amount of money is decreased then the incentive decreases.
8. A tax always reduces the amount of money offered to do X
9. Therefore taxes always reduce the incentive to do X


The implication of this simple principle is that when someone offers to tax a good or service, he is by consequence reducing people's incentive to do that service or consume that good.

When all of this is realized, it becomes very interesting to consider how our tax system is levied. Here are some commonly held ideas

1. Tax the "rich"
2. Tax businesses that employ people.
3. Tax large oil companies with windfall profits tax (95% tax after a set amount)
4. Tax capital gains (investment)
5. Tax death

What's even more bizzar is many are in favor of having very high taxes on corporations, and very wealthy people and families. Barack Obama for example is in favor of taxes as high as 39% on individuals making $200k or more, and a family making $250k or more. Now I think it's reasonable to say that in general those who are earning such a high amount are the most productive in the sense that their services or labor is in such high demand. It's also reasonable to assume that in general those who earn such a high amount are the most responsible for employing people. Given those facts it seems odd to reduce people's incentive to remaining productive in the same ways.

Consider Obama's desire to raise the capital gains tax. Obama's was asked about this during a democratic presidential debate with Hillary Clinton.

GIBSON: All right. You have, however, said you would favor an increase in the capital gains tax. As a matter of fact, you said on CNBC, and I quote, "I certainly would not go above what existed under Bill Clinton," which was 28 percent. It's now 15 percent. That's almost a doubling, if you went to 28 percent.
But actually, Bill Clinton, in 1997, signed legislation that dropped the capital gains tax to 20 percent.

OBAMA: Right.
GIBSON: And George Bush has taken it down to 15 percent.
OBAMA: Right.
GIBSON: And in each instance, when the rate dropped, revenues from the tax increased; the government took in more money. And in the 1980s, when the tax was increased to 28 percent, the revenues went down.
So why raise it at all, especially given the fact that 100 million people in this country own stock and would be affected?
OBAMA: Well, Charlie, what I've said is that I would look at raising the capital gains tax for purposes of fairness.

Obama has since considered lowering that figure to 20%, probably due all of the heat he's received from it. In either case, when we consider the principles being discussed this idea seems counter productive. From what I understand, capital gains are gains earned from when a stock is sold. The result of the tax will be a decrease in the incentive to invest, or at the very least invest in risky stocks (stocks of those who are probably just starting out).

2. REFUTING THE CLAIM "CHEAP LABOR HURTS THE US"
Technology Analogy

Imagine there's a manufacturer of toothpaste who currently has 100 people working for him manually putting together the paste & tubes they go into. His current rate of production is say 5,000 tubes of toothpaste a day, his production costs per tube is $10, and he sells them for $15.


Thousands of people every month buy his toothpaste.
Now imagine this man meets an engineer and they discuss business. The engineer talks about inventing a machine that may assist him in his toothpaste business.


Time goes by and the machine is finished. This manufacturer can now produce 50,000 tubes a day at the cost of $1 per tube. Not only does this equate to 10x the amount of production at 1/10th the cost, but the machine can easily be maintained with 10 people.


The manufacturer lays off all 90 of the least productive or needed employees and begins training the remaining 10 how to use the machine and then doubles their pay.

He now can not only provide 10x the amount of toothpaste but now sells it at $2, saving it's customers on average $300 a year.


Is this a good or bad thing? This in summary is the essence of technology. Technology allows human beings to do more things at lower costs. This is undoubtedly a good thing, and could even be said to be the best thing that could ever happen to humanity since it allows us to produce more of what we want and need with less work.


Now let's say this machine was in a different state from the manufacturer. Is this bad? Let's say the machine was in another country. Is it any less good? Now let's say it's not a machine but 1000 workers. Is it now bad?


To those who would say that free trade harms the US or the other country economically is now in a very absurd position, since economically speaking there's no difference between a machine & a person, if the costs and production speed are the same, and there's obviously no logical reason why the distance between the machine and the manufacturer would make this any less good, yet this is exactly what free trade opponents are saying.


It is undoubtedly true that 90 people lost their jobs. Many people who were in the horse & buggy industry lost their jobs when the automobile became less expensive and more people exploited its benefits. Many in the type writer industry lost their jobs with the advent of the personal computer. Yet, all of these changes are good things that have increased the standard of living for everyone.
3. REFUTING THE CLAIM
"NON-MONETARY TRADE DOES NOT INVOLVE PROFIT"

Non-monetary profit

When defending economic freedom, or as some call capitalism, I'm often confronted with the notion that non-monetary trades are not "for profit" but are done because the trade is "fair" or "more fair" then a trade or transaction done for profit.

For example, in discussion with a member of the Socialist Labor Party‎ a part of the conversation on profit, trade, and labor went something like this.

Socialist: The capitalist employer steals the 'true' value of a workers labor by profit. A worker's labor may produce 10 chairs a day but his wage can only buy him 4 chairs. Therefore the workers true labor is 'really' 10 chairs. The capitalist is therefore stealing his real labor for profit.

Me: Of course, if the employer paid the man more or equal to the amount of output there'd be no incentive to hire him. If a worker makes a business $1,000 richer by increasing production, you're not going to pay him $1,500. (I then blabbed about supply & demand etc)

All right, what about if I trade you 2 chairs for your table, and there is no money involved, is that wrong?

Socialist: No. There is no profit involved.

This idea is brought up in many different forms. The idea that a trade, if done with goods or services alone is not for "profit"

The concept of profit of course is the idea that you gain more than you invested, or the idea that you receive/benefit more than you put in. In monetary terms this is when you buy a good at $1 and sell it for $1.50, making a 50cent profit. Of course, we also speak of profit in terms of gaining in any sense. You could say that many profit from education, since what they get from an education is valued far greater than what was lost receiving it – time & energy.

Let's take the case of the man who trades two chairs for one table. This is claimed to be a 'fair' trade not for profit. Why would anyone trade two chairs for a table? The man obviously values the table more than his chairs, and the man must also value the chairs more than his table. Here we have a situation where the objects have a value relative to each man. In each case the value of the good desired is higher than the good being traded for.

Value is not an objective property but rather something that depends on the existence of minds to desire things. Oil has much more value than dog poop, and the reason has nothing to do with the essence of oil but the fact that it has a much higher demand for it – compared to dog poop. Imagine if tomorrow they discover that dog poop can be converted into something your car can run on – the value of dog poop would change. Its change is directly linked to its demand, which is the word used to described how much something is desired. So any notions of "real" value or "objective" value are false and based on a false concept of value. The term "real" value or "objective" value – in the sense that things have value independent minds/desires – is used time and time again in the discussions of economics, often by those trying to argue that profit or capitalism only works if people are suckered into buying something for more than its "real value." Those who argue this simply are clinging to false and emotionally driven intuitions about the concept of value, and simply have not thought it through.

When this trade occurs, the result is that both men are now in possession of something that was deemed more valuable to them. Both men gained more than they lost – they profited. In the same way that someone makes a monetary profit by receiving more money than they put out.
By: David Campbell
Originally written: Monday, September 15, 2008

FreeWill - Principle of Alternative Possibilities

COULD HAVE DONE OTHERWISE?
One of the many claims made by incompatibilists, either it be libertarians or hard determinists, is that if determinism is true, then we could not have done otherwise, and if we could not have done otherwise then we can't be considered free agents, let alone morally responsible for whatever action we do. They argue that given a certain situation, we must have the ability to do something other than what we did. This principle has been titled the "Principle of Alternative Possibilities" (PAP) by the philosopher Harry Frankfurt. [1]

PAP: A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise

This principle at first appears very intuitive, so intuitive that some philosophers have been said to consider it an a prior truth. How can someone be blamed for doing something, if they could not have done otherwise? One thing to point out is, what people who argue this 'could have done otherwise' principle mean is, that in the exact same circumstances one could have chosen differently. By exact same circumstances, we mean same the state of affairs – every event in the cosmos. The same stars burning at the same temperature, the same emotional state of the agent, every position and velocity of every object, even every atom, in the cosmos.
However if determinism is true, then we could not have done otherwise in the sense given above. If the universe we live in is a mechanistic machine governed by uniform laws, as the determinist believes, then given the same circumstances, the same outcome will occur. If God cranked the universe's wheel of time back to 3pm the same events that took place at 4pm will occur. So under the assumption of determinism, we could not have done otherwise. This means that if determinism is true, and the PAP principle is true, then the compatibilist conception fails, since the compatibilist conception of freedom is that we are free and morally responsible in a real sense, even under the assumption that determinism is true.
However the Principle of Alternative Possibilities is false. You can be considered free and morally responsible even if you could not have done otherwise. I will also argue that the concept of an agent doing otherwise or choosing differently in the same circumstances is impossible even under the assumption that determinism is false. Not only this, but I will show that even if we assume an agent can be said to 'do' otherwise, this would only render the agent unfree and by extension not morally responsible for the act.

Is PAP true?

So then, can a person be considered free even if the person could not have done otherwise? Harry Frankfurt has argued a person can, and does so with a thought experiment that takes many forms. His exact argument can be found in his original essay, but the variations will do. The thought experiment goes as follows:

"Bob passionately wants to kill the president, and plans to do so when he comes and speaks in his hometown on Monday. A fringe political group discovers this, and has an invested interest in the president being dead. The night before the president's speech, the group kidnaps Bob and plants a neural-disruption chip in his brain. If Bob has second thoughts, and decides against killing the president, the chip will activate and in turn cause him to kill the president. Bob wakes up, and kills the president. The chip never activated."

The question is - did Bob kill the president voluntarily, of his freewill? It seems obvious he did. Would he be considered morally responsible for what he has done? Again, yes. Could he have done otherwise? No. The moment that he would have had second thoughts which would have altered his course of action, the chip would have activated rendering him unable to not kill the president. The mere presence of the chip prevented the possibility of doing otherwise, yet he's considered morally responsible for what he did. Now, if he had second thoughts, and the chip was activated then of course he could not be considered free in his assassination. Now some may object to this thought experiment on the grounds that a chip like that may never exist making it cute at best, but nothing of a real challenge to the truth of PAP. There are more down to earth versions. Consider the following:

"Imagine that while Bob is driving, he sees Paul starting to cross the road ahead of him. Bob decides that he does not want to slow down for Paul, and continues on at the same speed. Paul, who is unable to get out of the way of Bob's car, is run over. As a result, Paul is killed instantly.

Assuming that Bob is a rational and sane human being, it seems clear-cut that he is morally responsible for what he did. Now imagine that, unbeknownst to Bob, the road that he was traveling on was covered in ice. Due to the ice, even if Bob had tried to stop the car from hitting Paul, he would not have been able to and Paul would have been killed anyway. Let us further imagine that Bob does not try to stop the car. It seems that we would still want to hold Bob responsible for what he did even though he would have run Paul over regardless of whether or not he hit his brakes. If Bob had hit his brakes, then one might argue that he would not be morally responsible for what he did. However, the fact of the matter is that Bob did not hit his brakes. It seems, then, that Bob is morally responsible for what he did even though he could not have done otherwise."

It seems that the ability to do otherwise is somewhat irrelevant. It seems that what matters is that the person at hand was aware of what's going on, and acted on his desires. In both cases, these men would be considered morally responsible because they were quite aware of what they were doing, and of course they wanted to do what they did.

The Principle of Alternative Possibilities states that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. However, this is not necessarily the case as shown by Frankfurt. It seems there may be other conditions that must be met for a person to possess freewill.

Doing otherwise?

As explained above, some argue that 'do otherwise' means 'could have chosen different under the same circumstances.' Not just similar circumstances, but the exact same circumstances, and not similar times but at the same time. This means that when the golfer misses the put and says "Ah, I could have made that" and picks the ball up, placing it in the same position, in order to simulate the circumstances, he's not actually 'doing otherwise' in this sense. All factors must be the same, the same stars burning at the same temperature, the same emotional state of the agent, every position and velocity of every object, even every atom, in the cosmos. This is one of the conditions that must be met for the CD (could done otherwise) principle. Another condition is that "I could" or "you could" have done otherwise. In other words, doing otherwise means choosing otherwise, there must be a connection between the act and the agent.

Let's first sketch what 'doing' looks like (choice making).

Richard is driving to his friend David's house which is out of town. As he drives down the road, he encounters a fork in the road where he has two options. The path on the left (A) is a little faster but has an 'under construction' sign, whereas the path on the right (B) takes longer but is construction free. As Richard drives along he thinks back on his last trip to David's where he decided to take the faster path, but as a consequence ran over a large screw which resulted in a flat tire. Richard then decides to take the longer, but safer, path.

This is simple, but what actually happened? What events took place? How can this event be broken down? First we have Richard the agent. An agent is a being with intentions and goals. Not only is he an agent, but he is a person. Richard is the totality of his character, beliefs and desires.
Second Richard's driving is for the sake of some goal, namely to arrive at his friends. This means all his actions are corresponding to a desired end. Richard encounters the fork in the road. Data from the world travels to Richard's eyes and eventually to his mind. After this happens an extremely fast and complicated set of processes begin. After the light travels to his Occipital Lobe (the part of the mind that deals with vision), each object is recognized (road, sign etc) and associated with certain meanings. With the available data he then reasons on what action corresponds best to the goal. Since there are two options that best correspond to the goal, he then produces a virtual future for each course of action where he reasons what each action will entail. He taps into his memory of the last visit and remembers what occurred when path A was taken. Path (A) entails he will reach his desired goal faster, but with the risk of getting a flat. Path (B) entails him reaching his desired goal slower, but with the benefit of not getting a flat. With the two virtual futures in his mind, he then selects which of those virtual futures he wants to make an actual future. After all of this is reasoned out, he makes the choice of taking path B.
A voluntary action (doing) can be therefore reduced to: An agent receives input from the world, examines acquired data, reasons through what possible actions entail (ie: producing virtual futures), selects which virtual future best corresponds to the goal, and eventually acts rendering the virtual future an actual future.
The fundamental aspect of this process that makes the act Richard's 'doing' and not the act of someone else, or something else is that there is a real connection between which future is actualized and Richard himself. Which future is actualized is determined by Richard's character along with his goals.
Now lets say 10 minutes after Richard chose path B, we were to 'rewind' time so to speak to the same time in the same circumstances. If determinism is true, then the same outcome of course will occur. All variables will be the same, Richard's emotional state, what's in his field of vision, the position of his head etc. Richard with the same goals, same state of mind, will of course choose path B. What conditions are required for him to do otherwise in the same circumstances? First let's consider what conditions are required for not him doing otherwise, but just the otherwise part – the part where something other or something different can occur at time t under the same state of affairs.
If the cosmos is uniform in its behaviors governed by laws that in some sense are eternal and unchanging, then determinism is a logical consequence. The only condition that must be the case for determinism to be false is to invoke random events. Random being either uncaused or in some sense 'in principle unpredictable' events. This appears to be the only option, since if the cosmos is uniform in it's behaviors, the only way a different outcome is possible is if you change one of the variables, however once some variable is changed it's no longer the exact same circumstances, but a variation of those circumstances. Imagine we rewind time to time t (time t being a specific time), and let everything play out. If you are to allow for some kind of random or uncaused event, imagine say 10 atoms freak out and change their course, then a different outcome is possible.
Let us now apply this to the aspect of doing otherwise. Again PAP states that a person can only be considered free or morally responsible if he could have done otherwise in the same circumstances. The important part is not whether a different outcome is possible at time t but that an outcome is different by virtue of the agent doing. In our example with Richard picking a path, we have many steps of the way. We have Richard receiving input from the world, examining acquired data, reasoning through what possible actions entail (ie: producing virtual futures), selecting which virtual future best corresponds to the goal, and eventually acts rendering the virtual future an actual future. The part that can be said to be 'the act of doing' is when Richard selects the virtual, or imagined, futures causing his future actions (moving his arms, etc.) to be in correspondence to the goal. This of course can be further reduced to events going on inside the brain. Richard's character, his beliefs, desires, memories, etc. all are stored in his brain, and play a role in which path he chooses. All of this exists by virtue of a huge nexus of neurons communicating with each other via electric impulse.

If we are to imagine what is required to change which course of action Richard took at time t, via the use of a random/uncaused event, then we'll no doubt discover it to be some event in the brain. One of the events in the long chain of events must be 'randomized' for him to do otherwise.

The main events are: (1) an agent receives input from the world, (2) examines acquired data, (3) reasons through what possible actions entail (ie: producing virtual futures), (4) selects which virtual future best corresponds to the goal, and eventually acts rendering the virtual future an actual future. The red represents mentally produced events, or mental events.

Richard is at the fork in the road, and all the events listed above are taking place. Now imagine a few of the signals traveling in Richard's brain, say from the part of his mind that contains memories to another part, are disrupted due to a random event causing them to travel to another part of his mind, or to stop traveling altogether. (Keep in mind this is exactly what is required for PAP to work) Richard then ends up still picking path B but turning his steering wheel one inch more to the right than before at time t. Although in a technical sense he did do otherwise since Richard did something different in the same circumstances, but what most supporters of PAP really mean is that a person can make an entirely different choice.

What would it take for Richard to choose path A, or another path? In our thought experiment above we imagined that a few signals were disrupted, but it's been estimated that the human brain contains between eighty five - one hundred billion neurons (85,000,000,000 – 100,000,000,000) so we'll certainly need more than a few connections to be disrupted for an entirely different 'choice' to come out. Let's assume that Richard made the choice on his own, without the intervention of indeterminism, puts 12 billion neurons to use. It seems that to alter the path Richard chooses, we'll have to disrupt at least half of those connections.

The problem here is, random or uncaused events can not be attributed to Richard. If during Richard's reasoning process, a random indeterministic event occurs, resulting in a different outcome from time t, then it no longer is true the choice is the result of Richard. You could not attribute the doing to Richard since the doing is the result of random events. This problem that arises when you attempt to invoke indeterminism to save freewill has been pointed out by the philosopher Daniel Dennett responding to the philosopher Robert Kane:

"The problem is compounded for Kane, since he has to figure out some way to get the undetermined quantum event to be not just in you but yours. He wants above all for the decision to be "up to you," but if the decision is undetermined - the defining requirement of libertarianism - it isn't determined by you, whatever you are, because it isn't determined by anything. Whatever you are, you can't influence the undetermined event - the whole point of quantum indeterminacy is that such quantum events are not influenced by anything. [...] But in order to do this, there has to be more to you than just some mathematical point, you have to be someone; you have to have thoughts - memories, plans, beliefs, and desires - that you've acquired along the way..."

Daniel Dennett - Freedom Evolves: pg – 123

The Principle of could done otherwise states that we can only be free if we could have done otherwise, however for there to even be a 'do otherwise' there must be a do-er responsible for the otherwise – as we have seen the only possible condition for 'otherwise' is to invoke random or uncaused events. When random or uncaused events are introduced then the link between the do-er and the otherwise is lost. Statements such as "Richard choose path B" presuppose that there's a connection between the agent and the choice, there must be a causal connection, a real connection, between the agent and the choice otherwise the agent is not responsible for the doing. So on closer examination the statement "You're only free if you could have done otherwise" in the senses listed at the top of the chapter entails a contradiction, since one can only be considered a the 'do-er' if what was 'done' was directly linked to the 'do-er' and not the result of random events.

Thus, PAP entails the impossible. It's impossible in short because for an agent to 'do' is only possible under determinism, and 'otherwise' (in the senses above) is only possible under indeterminism.

Don't blame me, I did otherwise!
So far I have argued that not only is PAP false, but entails somewhat of a contradiction. Here I will argue that even if we grant 'doing otherwise' is possible, it would only render the agent not responsible for the action. As said above, if the action is the result of random events this severs the connection between agent and choice. A consequence of this is that the agent can't possibly be held responsible for what occurred. An interesting thought experiment has been published by the historian Richard Carrier. Although the quote is pertaining to libertarian freewill, it touches on the PAP principle in the sense of doing otherwise in the exact same circumstances.

"Image two parallel universes, identical in every detail, and imagine a man in each universe, identical in their character, knowledge, desires and everything else, standing in totally identical circumstances. Now imagine that one of these men chooses to kill his wife, but the other man chooses not to. What could possibly explain this? Since the two situations and the two men are identical in every respect, there can be no cause whatsoever for either man's choice. This is what Moreland's theory entails.

But this has an unacceptable consequence. For it means that neither these men's desires, nor their knowledge, nor their moral character - nothing at all - can be blamed for having caused their choice. Moreland even agrees: "no description of our desires, beliefs, character, or other aspects of our makeup and no description of the universe prior to and at the moment of our choice...is sufficient to entail that we did it" (138-9). But this means that we could not even say that the first man was evil and the second good, since that would assume the first man's badness caused him to kill, while the other man's goodness caused him to refrain. But these men are identical, so one cannot be evil and the other good. Moreland might say he is evil or good after the deed, but that means we could not say he did what he did because he was a good or bad man. In fact, we could not say at all why he acted. What quality in either man that is uniquely a part of "him" can be blamed for causing his particular choice? There is none.

Now imagine that this man is you, and in one universe you kill your wife, in the other you do not. What would you think of yourself then? You would know that nothing causes your actions - not your character, nor your environment, nor the surrounding circumstances, nor your knowledge, not even your love of your wife. Nothing. Your choice to kill or refrain is purely a result of happenstance: whichever the universe you are in is a mere luck of the draw. Imagine how you would feel, having learned that it is nothing but the result of unpredictable randomness whether you kill your wife or not at this very moment. Shocking, yes? Imagine that you refrain from killing, but could step into a time machine, run the universe back a million times, and watch yourself again each time, and then saw that sometimes you killed and sometimes you didn't, even though each time all the circumstances including your thoughts, desires, character, everything were the same. There would be no rhyme or reason to why you did this one or the other. It would be a mere shake of the dice. This is the nightmare of a world that Moreland's theory describes." - Richard Carrier - A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism

If we could do otherwise, it would most probably be like having Tourettes Syndrome. Having no control over our actions, being the victims of the random, and being reduced to uncontrollable random machines. Thomas Pink has mentioned this issue with conceptions of freewill that rely on indeterminism

"There is yet another problem that faces the libertarian. Is libertarian freedom something we could ever exercise, in the only way that freedom ever can be exercised, though what we deliberately do, in genuine and intelligible action? Libertarian freedom seems to reduce what we do to no more than blind, undirected motion – to the equivalent to jerks and spasms." Thomas Pink - Free Will: A Very Short Introduction – pg 83

What do we mean?
Some of those reading this may be convinced in what has just been said, and some of you may already be familiar with the topic and had been convinced long ago – yet some of us will continue to say 'sorry, I could have done it but…' or 'I could have done otherwise' casually in our daily lives. It rolls of the tongue, and we mean something when we say it. What do we actually mean? Sometimes language can be a difficult thing to get around in discussions of philosophy, and getting a clear understanding on what words mean, and what we mean should be an important goal when we consider certain ideas. The principles that have been talked about above have dealt with doing something different in the same circumstances at the same time, yet on closer examination we discover that in practice we run into trouble, yet we will continue use that kind of language.
Is it possible we mean something incoherent? An interesting example of this might be the idea of changing the future. You'll hear politicians say it all the time – "Let's change the future!" – change the future? From what to what? The future is what will happen, what are you going to change? That may not be a good example, since one just a moment of reflection we discover that what people are really getting at is the idea of changing the anticipated future. If things are to continue as they are now, then we ought to expect X, thus changing how things are now will alter what we are to expect. Another possible example is the idea of having a mind - or more specifically the statement "I have a brain." Our scientific understanding of the mind is that it is the manifestation of a kind of brain. The self in a way resides in the mind, which is the product of the brain. So to say "I have a brain" is somewhat like saying "my brain has a brain." Some have even argued that we have a cognitive dispassion to divide the world into two kinds of things – minds and objects. So notions of a disembodied self come so natural that we find our self speaking in a way that presupposes the truth of dualism. Another possibility, one that I have speculated on, is that since the great majority of our ancestors held certain religious or superstitious views, our language and way of speaking naturally reflects that.
What I think we may mean when we say such things is not that we could have done differently given the exact circumstances, but rather, we could have done otherwise if we had known better. We could have done otherwise if we had chosen differently. That's utterly uncontroversial, since it's quite obvious that different outcomes are entail by different circumstances. So could it be that all we're really saying is "If I knew what I know now, I would have done differently" or "If I had chosen differently, I would have done differently" – It's hard to say.
1. Harry Frankfurt, "Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility," in Free Will, ed.
Gary Watson ( Oxford Univerity Press, 2003), 167.
2. Shariff, G.A. 1953. Cell counts in the primate cerebral cortex. J. Comp. Neurol. 98:381–400

By: David Campbell
Originally written: Sunday, June 10, 2007

It sure does not feel like it!

When some people discover the mechanistic or scientific explanations for certain things pertaining to a human experience, some will have an intuitive form of skepticism. You will often hear something to the effect that "Fine, but it does not feel as though X is the result of Y." X being some kid of experience, such as the experience of love, the experience of consciousness, or the experience and conviction that we posses freewill. Y being some kind of natural process or material process.

The argument often goes as follows:

David: It's pretty much universally agreed, by scientists at least that subjective experience is a consequence of a kind of physical brain. All kinds of things support the idea that a physical brain is required for subjective experience -- like the fact that alcohol and other physical substances can change our conscious states, that degenerative brain diseases such as Alzheimer's or physical injuries can seriously impair or even destroy conscious states, and the fact that we don't expect young children to be capable of the types of abstract reasoning that require more fully developed brains. So the idea that we need immaterial souls or whatnot to account for our minds, at least at the moment, is ad hoc.

Gatlin: I see. That may be true, but I still can't overcome my conviction that all of this subjective experience I feel is something above and beyond just matter in motion. It just does not feel as though consciousness is the result of 'just' physical processes going on in my brain. It feels like there's something going on that's immaterial.

There are many examples where this kind of 'from the gut' argument is made. In the context of accounts for love, spiritual experience, freedom, awareness. The argument is never an argument using some kind of objective measure, but rather an argument from experience, an argument from conviction. I think this kind of reasoning may be a mistake, at least in the context of trying to explain certain experiences. I'll begin making my case after a quote reportedly from Wittgenstein

"Wittgenstein: Tell me," he asked a friend, "why do people always say it was natural for man to assume that the Sun went round the Earth, rather than that the Earth was rotating?"

His friend replied, "Well, obviously because it just looks as though the Sun is going round the Earth."

And Wittgenstein replied, "Well, what would it have looked like, if it had looked as though the Earth was rotating?"

It's interesting to consider this. What would it look like if the earth was rotating, and not the sun? It obviously, would look exactly the same. We could ask the same question to the skeptic who asserts that it does not feel like love is a natural thing, or that consciousness is physically possible. What would it feel like if love was a natural thing? What would it feel like if subjective experience was the result of only a physical brain? Would we 'feel' the atoms responding appropriately? Would we go "All right, now based on the situation, I should be feeling high levels of dopamine and norepinephrine and probably low levels of serotonin, oh boy here it comes! Aw, I love you!" What would a naturalistic/compatibilist notion of freewill feel like? Could we 'feel' our thoughts if the physicalist notion of the mind is true?

The main issue with this is, to claim that it would feel differently if our minds were 'physically possible' presupposes some type of way of comparing the two, and unless God grants us access to two different universes where love is magic and then love is natural, we have no way of possibly knowing. It's not as though we're talking about petting a dog, and someone claims that this dog has no hair. It's clear we could say something to the effect that it would feel like something else to pet a bald dog. Of course a bald dog and a furry dog are something that can be compared. So it seems such a statement could never be epistemicaly justified.

When I encounter a person like the hypothetical character as Gatlin, I find it fun to reverse the argument. "That's fine" I would reply "It just feels so much like my mind is the result of a physical brain." – I'm at least justified in saying that, although I may not know what it would feel like (assuming it would feel differently) to have a immaterial mind, I'm least am pretty sure what a materially produced mind feels like, since we're certain it's true we have one. Some may claim it feels as though our minds are magical, which leads to the conviction that they are, but like the rotation of the earth, it may be that a physicalist mind feels the same.

By: David Campbell
Originally written: Monday, May 28, 2007

Atheism & Meaning

The following is a response to a small dinner table conversation that was made yesterday on the topic of meaning in the context of an atheistic worldview (godless worldview). I was asked whether, as an atheist, I find meaning in things, and whether I find there is a purpose to life.

First let's try to figure out what's being said, and what it means.

MEANING

The most basic form of meaning is the meaning of words. "Cat" refers to a specific animal, with specific features (mammal, furry etc). The word "Cat" itself would be meaningless if it did not refer to something outside of itself. One can't imagine a set of symbols simply meaning something intrinsically. Lopletrox is a meaningless for the very reason that those symbols do not refer to any object or state of affairs, however, the moment a object/state of affairs is designated for the word Lepletrox the word has a meaning.

So it appears that meaning in the context of language is relational to objects/states of affairs. The meaning of words is therefore extrinsic (not essential or inherent; not a basic part or quality), and not intrinsic (belonging to a thing by its very nature)

The meaning of words therefore can be summarized as: Word X has meaning IF X refers to Y

What about the meaning of objects or persons? Think about something that has meaning, or means something to you, and try and pin down what about that thing or person is different that it is meaningful?

I have a small teddy bear I named Taker (for when I was younger, I took him everywhere). It's the same bear that was given to me when I was born. This small teddy bear has a great deal of meaning to me. When I put taker next to another teddy bear that does not have meaning it becomes clear why Taker has meaning while the other does not. Taker has been with me my entire life and is probably one of the first objects I've ever touched. Taker has meaning because it's associated with certain valued memories or certain rare moments. So again, it appears that the meaning of taker is relational and extrinsic. However, not like words, taker refers to certain mental/subjective states. Taker's meaning exists under the conditions that he refers to certain valued or rare events/memories.

So the meaning of objects & persons can be summarized as: X has meaning IF X refers to certain valued mental-states in person P

The commonality of these types of meaning are that they are A) Relational (quality only exists in relation to something else) B) Extrinsic (not inherent) C) Subjective (requires a mind to exist to make the reference of words, requires a mind to be referred to in objects/persons)

Now, when I was asked about meaning I tried my best to summerise this. Mike E. after I was done, said 'basically, there is no meaning' to which I replied that there was, he replied 'it's not objective meaning'

OBJECTIVE MEANING?

What about objective meaning? What does this mean? Let's first make the distinction between objective and subjective.

Subjective
1. existing in the mind; belonging to the thinking subject
2. relating to properties or specific conditions of the mind as distinguished from general or universal experience

Objective1. existing independent of thought or an observer as part of reality.

2. intent upon or dealing with things external to the mind rather than with thoughts or feelings

"The earth is round" is objective since it's truth is independent of thought or minds. The existence of agents is not a condition that is required for such a statement to be true. "The sun is warm" is subjective in the sense that 'warmth' is a feeling. Sensations exist in minds. The statement 'the sun is warm' can only be true if there exists agents/minds. Now, there is another sharp distinction that needs to be made before everyone gets confused. A subjective statement can be objectively true and still remain subjective. "I am warm" refers to a subjective state of the mind, but it's truth is objective since my my feeling of warmth remains to be true regardless of other minds. You can objectively measure my subjective feeling. Now, with the sun, we may label 100 degrees as 'hot' and therefore the sun was hot before the existence of life. But that's simply a label referring to an objective state of affairs, namely the measurable temperature. The subjective experience of such objective states of affairs, such as warmth is still subjective although its of objective states of affairs! Sorry, just read that twice and you'll understand.

So can something have 'objective meaning?' - After thinking about whats required for something to have meaning the answer it clearly no. If [X has meaning IF X refers to certain valued mental-states in person P] is true, then objective meaning becomes an oxymoron. Things have meaning in relation to subjects, so how can you have a subjective-objective thing? It would be like saying "It's my objective thought" - If objective means 'existing independent of thought' how can you have a thought that is independent of thought? I'll give you $500 if you have an objective thought.

So if all that has been said is true, then Mike is right, under atheism there is no objective meaning - but that's only true because objective meaning is an oxymoron.

PURPOSE?

For something to have a purpose, by definition, it must be something that is designed/formed/created with an intention/goal in mind. A fork has a purpose only by virtue that it was designed with the intention of a certain use. Intentionality is the key to purpose. So of course in an atheistic universe, the universe and man has no purpose since it was not designed with any intentionality. Forks, houses, TVs, job classes still have purpose, since they are motivated by intention. So to say "if atheism is true there is no purpose" is simply false.

Some may say, and Mike E. will or has "Yeah, but it's not ultimate purpose." If what is meant by this is, ultimately the entire cosmos has no purpose. Of course, but that's true with god as well. Was god created/designed with a goal in mind? No, by definition god just exists eternally. So the same argument could made against theism "Since god has no purpose, there's no ultimate purpose in a theistic universe"

Again, one may respond with "(1) God gives himself purpose!" or "(2) He has intrinsic purpose!" - First if (1) is true, then the claim "there's no purpose in an atheist universe" becomes false, because man could then assign purpose to himself or the cosmos. Second, (2) is just nonsense. 'intrinsic purpose' is a compete oxymoron. For something to be intrinsic, it must be inherent or 'by its very nature' - How can something be "designed with an intention" by its very nature? Purpose by definition is a quality that is only possible in relation to a mind. If it's a properties is intrinsic, it's not in relation to anything. So the whole idea of 'intrinsic purpose' is contradictory.

Conclusion: In an atheistic worldview there can be meaning, it's not objective since that's impossible and contradictory. There is no purpose to life or the cosmos, but that's true of a god himself.

By David Campbell
Originally written:Wednesday, March 21, 2007

Naturalism, Determanism & Freewill

One of the objections people have to a naturalist worldview is that if naturalism is true then "Determinism follows...and therefore freewill is an illusion" or "There's no freewill." or "Then we're simply rag dolls to the laws of nature"
What do we make of this?
1. Determinism does not necessarily follow
Metaphysical Naturalism, at its most fundamental level is simply the view that all reality is natural. Which is to say the cosmos is non-sentient. All minds, and all the contents and powers and effects of minds, are entirely caused by natural [i.e. fundamentally nonmental] phenomena. This could be true in a universe with random (uncaused) events.
2. Indeterminism fails to save freewill
When one who maintains a belief in freewill claims determinism is incompatible with freedom, he is directly implying that indeterminism is. Of course, this is nonsense since indeterminism simply entails that not all events are caused [i.e. random]. If someone attempts to enter randomness into the equation it simply makes things worse, since if one claims that our choices are 'uncaused' then it's no longer true "I choice X" for the self precedes the event and if the choice was uncaused then the 'self' could not be the cause of the choice. All other attempts to force randomness into the picture are pathetic and unthoughtful.
3. 'Libertarian freewill' is an oxymoron.
Libertarian freewill has be defined as:

A. The power or ability to rationally choose and consciously perform actions, at least some of which are not brought about necessarily and inevitably by external circumstances

B. "given a choice...nothing determines which choice is made" - HP Moreland
The libertarian view of freewill can be powerfully convincing when one asks "If determinism is true, then at any point in time, could you have done other than what you did?" - The answer is a very clear "No." This seems so uneasy, you think "my goodness, this means I do not have the freedom to change the future! I have no freedom ah!" This is misguided, it can be demonstrated in a simple thought experiment:
"Image two parallel universes, identical in every detail, and imagine a man in each universe, identical in their character, knowledge, desires and everything else, standing in totally identical circumstances. Now imagine that one of these men chooses to kill his wife, but the other man chooses not to. What could possibly explain this? Since the two situations and the two men are identical in every respect, there can be no cause whatsoever for either man's choice. This is what Moreland's theory entails.
But this has an unacceptable consequence. For it means that neither these men's desires, nor their knowledge, nor their moral character - nothing at all - can be blamed for having caused their choice. Moreland even agrees: "no description of our desires, beliefs, character, or other aspects of our makeup and no description of the universe prior to and at the moment of our choice...is sufficient to entail that we did it" (138-9). But this means that we could not even say that the first man was evil and the second good, since that would assume the first man's badness caused him to kill, while the other man's goodness caused him to refrain. But these men are indentical, so one cannot be evil and the other good. Moreland might say he is evil or good after the deed, but that means we could not say he did what he did because he was a good or bad man. In fact, we could not say at all why he acted. What quality in either man that is uniquely a part of "him" can be blamed for causing his particular choice? There is none.
Now imagine that this man is you, and in one universe you kill your wife, in the other you do not. What would you think of yourself then? You would know that nothing causes your actions - not your character, nor your environment, nor the surrounding circumstances, nor your knowledge, not even your love of your wife. Nothing. Your choice to kill or refrain is purely a result of happenstance: whichever the universe you are in is a mere luck of the draw. Imagine how you would feel, having learned that it is nothing but the result of unpredictable randomness whether you kill your wife or not at this very moment. Shocking, yes? Imagine that you refrain from killing, but could step into a time machine, run the universe back a million times, and watch yourself again each time, and then saw that sometimes you killed and sometimes you didn't, even though each time all the circumstances including your thoughts, desires, character, everything were the same. There would be no rhyme or reason to why you did this one or the other. It would be a mere shake of the dice. This is the nightmare of a world that Moreland's theory describes. - Richard Carrier: Sense And Goodness Without God: A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism
The libertarian notion of freewill entails that our actions have no casual relationship to what makes us a person (desires, knowledge, character). As a child some of us may have touched a hot pot of boiling water, after such an event we learn not to do it again. As adults when we tap into our memories when making choices, when the cookies are done we tap into a past memory of being burned, or simply tap into the existing knowledge of heat and it's relationship to pain, so we put on gloves. Memory is information that is physically stored in the brain, we know this through simple experiments where patients when parts of the their brain are stimulated will report 'hearing a song' or 'smelling cookies', so to make a choice that's informed by past experience (memory) requires there to be a casual/deterministic relationship. Libertarian freewill entails a bloody murder of such events being possible. Libertarian freewill defenders would have us believe that such deterministic events would render an action 'not of ones freewill'
Richard Carrier continues:
Moreland defines libertarian free will as "given a choice...nothing determines which choice is made" (137). Nothing guarantees that a particulkar choice will be made, not even reasons, values, or knowledge. What he means is that thought we will always choose according to some 'desire' that we posses, which particular desire of the many we have that wins out is not determined in adnvced by anything but "us" (in some obscure sense of the word). this is how he explains it: "When agents will A, they could have also willed B without anything else being different inside or outside of their being" (137-8). So even if I want most of all not to raise my hand, according to Moreland, I might raise it anyway, presumably as long as I have minuscule desire to do it. Of course, this seems counter-intuitive right from the start. If the strongest desire in me is to stay still, how can I be caused to raise my hand by a weaker force?
Trying to bypass this problem, Moreland argues that desires and reasons and other things "influence" but do not "caused" our actions and choices. But it remains unclear just what the difference is suppose to be. my knowledge that a wall stands before me certainly causes me to choose to change the direction of my walk. My desire to live certainly causes me to avoid leaping out of windows. Yet Moreland would not say that walls and windows deprive us of our free will. So he has to elaborate somehow.
"Suppose some person," Moreland asks, "freely performed some act...say raising an arm in order to vote" (138). He says that this person "exerted [his] power as a first mover (an initiator of change) to bring about" the motion to vote. But what about the request to vote in the first place? Actually being in a circumstances that calls for a vote is itself a necessary condition for raising a hand to vote. Correct. But this does not mean the circumstances will be a sufficient cause of the action, and Moreland's point is that something else is necessary, which is unrelated to anything in or outside us.
But this thing is not our reason, knowledge, character, desires or anything at all really. And that creates a problem, for instance, Moreland includes in his theory the premise that this person "brought about [the choice] for the sake of some reason" which entails another necessary cause - the reason - without which the hand would never be raised. And this reasons will certainly correspond to a brain state, and a chain of causation can be followed as we examine the path of all the calculations and knowledge that are in turn necessary causes of that reason arising in our brain. So he is forced to reject even the obvious theory that reasons cause us to act.
The libertarian notion of freewill is so devastatingly absurd it's hard to believe anyone actually defends it. One only has to think about it for no longer than 5 minutes to learn it fails to match our intuitions on what is meant by freewill. However the idea keeps popping up. I personally think it's because when someone first learns about the issue of freewill, they are often presented the issue as a "determinism vs freewill" which presupposes there's no compatibility between the two. When you say "determinism vs. freewill" you're basically giving subtle credit to the libertarian view by implying that those views are at war. The truth is determinism (in a largely statistical sense) is a necessary condition for a free act, under the position I'm defending. Hearing "determinism vs. freewill" is like hearing "computer vs. windows xp"
What freewill really is.
An analogy from Freedom Evolves By Dan Dennett
"Recall the myth of Cupid, who flutters about on his cherubic wings making people fall in love by shooting them with his little bow and arrow. This is such a lame cartoonists' convention that it's hard to believe that anybody ever took any version of it seriously. But we can pretend: suppose that once upon a time there were people who believed that an invisible arrow from a flying god was a sort of inoculation that caused people to fall in love. And suppose some killjoy scientist then came along and showed them that this was simply not true: no such flying gods exist. "He's shown that nobody ever falls in love, not really. The idea of falling in love is just a nice--maybe even a necessary–fiction. It never happens." That is what some might say. Others, one hopes, would want to deny it: "No. Love is quite real, and so is falling in love. It just isn't what people used to think it is. It's just as good–maybe even better. True love doesn't involve any flying gods." The issue of free will is like this. If you are one of those who think that free will is only really free will if it springs from an immaterial soul that hovers happily in your brain, shooting arrows of decision into your motor cortex, then, given what you mean by free will, my view is that there is no free will at all. If, on the other hand, you think free will
might be morally important without being supernatural, then my view is that free will is indeed real, but just not quite what you probably thought it was. (p222)"
The freewill debate seems to be less about if we have it, but rather what we mean. All of us, even those who claim freewill is an illusion, have the strong conviction that our actions are the result of our will. We want to do stuff, so we do it. So if libertarian freewill fails to match what people actually mean in practice, what works?
Compatibilism is the position that a free action is an action that is the result of the desires of the agent. If there is an agent who receives data from the world, calculates virtual futures (possible outcomes), and acts out in accordance with his/her desires then such an agent has freewill. This entire process requires there to be deterministic relationships between the environment & the agent.
Conclusion
The claim that 'materialism/determinism' is incompatible with freewill is only true if one is referring to the libertarian view of freewill. Since the notion of libertarian freewill is absurd and false, the point becomes mute. The best definition of freewill is the view that actions that are the result of desires. Such a view is not only compatible with determinism but requires its truth.

By: David Campbell
Originally written: Sunday, February 11, 2007