Gay Marriage & Prop 8 - My position & why both sides are wrong.

As a person who lives in California I hear a lot of discussion of prop 8. Prop 8 was a ballot proposition that attempted to add the definition of marriage as a man and women in the state constitution. I personally voted no on prop 8 but did so for very different reasons than most people. I wanted to give a brief description of my position and why I think both sides are in many ways wrong.

People ask if I’m in favor of “gay marriage” – I’m not.
People ask if I’m in favor of “straight/traditional” marriage – I’m not.

I’m against the state.

In other words, I’m against the government being involved with marriage as an institution. I don’t believe it’s the role of the government to get involved in regulating what should be a private social institution.

This may seem like an odd position but all of us feel this way about other social or traditional rituals/institutions. Here is a list of things that many of us would be against the state being involved in, and this is what it would look like if they were involved in them.

Friendship licenses
A baptism license/permit
Birthday party permit
Sex contract/license

Imagine if the state were to require its people get a “baptism” license before they baptize their child. Certainly you can argue for the “sanctity” of baptism, the very definition of sanctity is holiness, saintliness, or godliness – which is the very reason we should oppose the state being involved. Is the purpose of the state to give us phony and meaningless documents “allowing” us to engage in activities like marriage or baptism? Is the idea of getting “permission” from a government to go fishing or have a birthday party consistent with a free society, or is it more consistent with a totalitarian one?

The proper function of the state I think most would agree is to protect our liberties, provide courts to handle disputes, and other basic functions – not to define and regulate rituals or traditions.

Now many will point out that the logic behind a marriage “license” is also a legal one. Many will point out that being married is a contract between two people that addresses issues like property inheritance, hospital visits, and other issues.

Of course these are all benefits that still could exist under secular civil unions. As of now you can get a civil union with anyone to resolve issues like this – even two roommates who were just friends could get a civil union. Marriage would still exist if we were to abolish state sponsored marriage, in the same way baptisms & birthday parties exist without the state. The difference would be a couple would get married in a church or whatever they wanted, it would be equally meaningful and “holy” in their eyes, but if they also wanted to resolve the legal issues they could get a civil union.

This may be an odd analogy but consider the way it is with driver’s license. As of now you can buy whatever vehicle you want – you can buy a motorcycle, a pink van, a tiny blue car whatever you like. The choice of color, type, size and location of purchase is something you decide. Of course if you want to use the state sponsored roads you must get a drivers license and registration. The registration process is secular and has nothing to do with the type or color of your car; it just is there to say “Hey California, I’m going to be driving around all right?”

The state is there to provide the legal stuff; you pick the car you want. Under our current system of marriage, it would be analogous to the state defining what color car you can drive and letting the people vote on “Prop 64 – to define a vehicle as a yellow Honda civic” – It’s a bazaar analogy but it makes the point.

How would abolishing the state’s involvement in marriage solve anything?

The reason that I believe this is the best way to resolve the ‘gay marriage’ debate is that it takes marriage out of the hands of the state and into the hands of the people – which will satisfy everyone involved. Here’s how:

Religious and traditional people personally do not recognize same-sex marriages and so naturally they’d be opposed to the state changing the definition of marriage. The underlying problem that defenders of traditional marriage have is with what definition they personally feel is right & moral being changed – this problem would disappear under privatized marriage. The Catholic Church defines its own doctrines, and the Democratic Party defines its values, and the state can’t dictate either values or doctrine to either of these organizations – why – because the state is not involved.

Under privatized marriage free men will define their own rituals and institutions according to their religious or personal beliefs, and would not have to bow down to some government that attempts to regulate their life.

Gay marriage supporters could get married or have whatever ritual they see fit and could get a secular civil union without any question. Of course the traditional marriage people may still not recognize their marriage as legitimate, and may even deny them access to their church for ceremonies – so what? That’s a product of a free society.

I do not recognize the Christian church as legitimate in the sense that its existence stands for truth since I believe Christianity is false. Mormons do not consider satanic rituals as legitimate, and many atheists do not see the Jewish tradition of chopping up a young boy’s penis up as legitimate. It’s a better world where people are free to decide on what they recognize as legitimate and not to have the state try to define things it has no business defining.

In short the problem isn’t with whether to define marriage this way or another, the problem is accepting that something as meaningful can even be up for a vote at all. Thomas Paine was quoted saying “That government is best which governs least” and I tend to agree with him.

Liberal economic confusion

1. NO TAX CUT BUILDS A ROAD

BARNEY FRANK: —that cannot be accomplished by a tax cut. No tax cut builds a road. No tax cut puts a cop on the street. No tax cut educates a child in the way that it ought to be done. So this—only tax cuts, at a time when I think we have a deficiency in some areas that are important for the quality of our life, is a big disagreement. - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mSw3QqSF_zU

There are a few things to say about this.

First, nobody claims a tax cut builds a road.

Second, because something does not build a road or puts a cop on the street is not a reason to be opposed to it when we’re talking about what is good for the US economy. Computers and beer do not put a cop on the street, so what? Are we supposed to oppose them on that ground?

Third, there’s a sense in which it’s false anyway. There are private roads, cops, and schools. These things exist because people have money. It’s easy to imagine how a “tax cut” which results in people having more of their own money using that money to pay for services like security, or education.



2. TAX CUTS FOR THE RICH

Obviously there’s an ocean of fallacious claims and reasoning when it comes to economics and especially with any statement that ends with “for the rich” by economic totalitarians (liberals). I’d like to briefly address some common claims.

On Bill Maher, he shows a graph showing that the bush tax cuts resulted in the top 10% of US earners keeping a lot more in dollars than 90%

(video here - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mrWXk6BCsXQ )

The graph shows that out of all the people who benefited, the “rich” received the most in terms of dollars, and this is supposed to show that the tax cuts were unfair. There are a few things to say about this.

First, by definition the “rich” will save the most in dollars than the non-rich. 25% of a million is 250,000, and 25% of 100 is 25. So waving around a graph showing that people with more money save more money when their taxes are reduced does not prove anything. Imagine if all people making 1 million dollars a year paid 50% in taxes (Leaving them only $500k a year), and all people who make $10k a year pay 10% in taxes (leaving them 9k). Now let’s say they lower taxes on the “rich” by 1% point, and cut taxes completely on the poor, where they pay nothing.

The rich would save $90k, and the poor would save $1k. The rich’s taxes were lowered 1% point, and the poor now by nothing. Wow! The “rich” got 90x what the poor got! Man, I can’t wait to go home and make a graph in PowerPoint so I can wave it around to people talking about how unfair that is. The point is that what’s important is the percentage, not the savings in dollars.

Second, let’s say its true the rich benefited the most from the tax cuts. Let’s say its true that they were the only ones in the US who got any tax cut. So what? You don’t judge the fairness of a tax on who pays what compared to whom, but what a group is paying to what they were paying. The rich paying 99% in taxes would be evil, and unjust – If they were to have their taxes reduced, and their taxes alone this would be justified even though the other groups did not get a tax break. The reality is showing that fairness is something that should be judged on more than just “who got what compared to the poor”


3. POLICY X WILL CREATE JOBS

A common argument in favor of a certain policy or government program is that the program or policy will result in jobs, and jobs are good and mean economic stimulus. A recent gimmick is Obama’s claim that his giant spending plan (he calls it the stimulus package) will result in jobs from the ‘infrastructure’ spending, and therefore it is simulative.

First, the principle ‘if x results in a job, then x is good for the economy’ is false. Cancer, brain tumors, and mental retardation all result in millions of jobs in the medical field, and yet it’s obvious that cancer is not ‘good’ for the economy. This is known as the ‘broken window fallacy.’ The fallacy is the idea that if X results in a job, X is good for the economy would imply that we could help the economy by tossing bricks into windows, resulting in a high demand for window repair jobs and windows.

Second, even if we can agree that X is simulative, it still needs to be weighed against the costs. We can all agree that a machine that makes cars is an economically desirable machine, since it allows more cars to be made, but if the man selling the machine demands a billion dollars a day for its use, then the benefits may not outweigh the costs. This is where the idea of ‘government jobs’ and the inherent wasteful nature of government comes in. If a man tried to sell his machine at a billion a day in the free market, buyers would reject the offer since they are spending their own money. The result would be the man would sell nothing if he does not lower his price. In government, where people are spending other people’s money, the incentive to be careful & ‘look for a good deal’ is not as strong. In addition, if the people vote for a person who promises a program, if that man is voted in then his main incentive is to create the program regardless of costs. In ‘Economics in One Lesson’ by Henry Hazlitt he expands on this.

“A bridge is built, If it is built to meet an insistent public demand, if it solves a traffic problem or a transportation problem otherwise insoluble, if, in short, it is even more necessary than the things for which the taxpayers would have spent their money if it had not been taxed away from them, there can be no objection. But a bridge built primarily "to provide employment" is a different kind of bridge. When providing employment becomes the end, need becomes a subordinate consideration. "Projects" have to he invented. Instead of thinking only where bridges must be built, the government spenders
begin to ask themselves where bridges can be built. Can they think of plausible reasons why an additional bridge should connect Easton and Weston? It soon becomes absolutely essential. Those who doubt the necessity are dismissed as obstructionists and reactionaries. Two arguments are put forward for the bridge, one of which is mainly heard before it is built, the other of which is mainly heard after it has been completed. The first argument is that it will provide employment. It will provide, say, 500 jobs for a year. The implication is that these are jobs that would not otherwise have come into existence. This is what is immediately seen. But if we have trained ourselves to look beyond immediate to secondary consequences, and beyond those who are directly benefited by a government project to others who are indirectly affected, a different picture presents itself. It is true that a particular group of bridge workers may receive more employment than otherwise. But the bridge has to be paid for out of taxes. For every dollar that is spent on the bridge a dollar will be taken away from taxpayers. If the bridge costs $1,000,000 the taxpayers will lose $1,000,000. They will have that much taken away from them which they would otherwise have spent on the things they needed most. Therefore for every public job created by the bridge project a private job has been destroyed somewhere else.”

Bailouts, Socialism, & bankrupt reasoning

1. X is too big to fail, and if it failed bad things would happen. Therefore the government should give X a bailout.

If we accept the idea of something being “too big to fail” as a reason to justify a bailout, then is the government too big to fail?

If you accept that the government is too big to fail, then the same kind of reasoning applies. The question then is, what would it look like for “the government to fail” and what could cause a “government to fail”?

In the same way a business fails due to lack of funds, the state could fail for the same reason. California is a great example of failure since it’s currently so bankrupt, from its citizens voting massive spending, that it actually talked about giving people “IOU’s” instead of the tax money they were owed. California even wanted to get a bailout of its own.

"I propose that we should get help from the federal government if we can again, also like the car manufacturers, prove that we have our fiscal house in order and that we can solve our problems ourselves but give us in this emergency kind of a situation or this crisis some addition money," – Schwarzenegger

So, now that we answered what it means for a government to fail, what would cause it? In California it was massive spending. If too much spending can cause a state to fail, what is a bailout? – Massive spending.

What does this mean? This means that simply by thinking for 1-2 minutes about the logic behind bailouts, you can be opposed to them *using the very same reasoning* people use to be in favor of them. If X is too big to fail, then Y ought to bail it out. Replace X with government and what could you possibly replace Y with? The only thing truly bankrupt is the logic used by the socialists in favor of bailouts. (Please don’t point out that Bush & Schwarzenegger favor bailouts as a way of showing it’s not socialist. Bush & Schwarzenegger are both socialists in that respect, and simply because you claim to be a conservative does not mean you are.)

State Intervention Opposition Fallacy

In some recent political conversation’s I’ve had with friends and strangers, I’ve come across a fallacious argument that’s so common that it deserves a name. I’ve already done a little re-search if there’s a term for this fallacy but have failed to find anything. The argument in short, is that one’s opposition to a governmental policy is to be against the intentions of the policy or it’s founders. Here are a few examples of this fallacy.

Charles: I agree with Obama that we ought to double our foreign aid to poor nations.

David: Yes, I hear that’s something he intends on doing, I don’t agree with him on that though.

Charles: I don’t get it, why are you opposed to that? Are you against helping poor nations? Don’t you think poor people should have food?

or

Charles: You know, obesity is a big problem, which is why I’m happy they passed a “trans fat” ban here in California.

David: I’m not happy at all, I don’t feel comfortable with the government regulating whether or not I can eat fatty foods.
Charles: …but don’t you want people have a healthier diet? Do you approve of people getting overweight?

The reasoning that motivates the questions asked by Charles is that David’s opposition to a governmental policy is to be against the intentions of the policy or its founders. What’s wrong with this? The error is that what is in question is not the intentions but the methods. The question on whether or governmental policy is just and should be supported is not solely determined by the intentions of the policy, but other considerations. Will the policy achieve its objective? Are there superior forms of that policy that will achieve the objective more efficiently? Does the government have the legal or constitutional right to do what is in question? Does the policy strip rights away from others? These are just a few important considerations that should determine whether a policy should be supported or exist at all.

I’m going to call this fallacy the “State Intervention Opposition Fallacy,” since the reasoning behind it is always in response to someone’s opposition to the state’s intervention.

Let’s consider the case of foreign aid. It’s obvious that the intentions of foreign aid are in part to help poor nations, if so why oppose it? For starters you could argue that giving poor nations food does address why they are poor in the first place but instead gives temporary assistance. Second, it’s clear that it’s unconstitutional and illegal. Here are some quotes by our founders and other political leaders:

" The government of the United States is a definite government, confined to specified objects. It is not like state governments, whose powers are more general. Charity is no part of the legislative duty of the government.”

-- James Madison, speech in the House of Representatives, January 10, 1794

"I cannot find any authority in the Constitution for public charity. [To approve the measure] would be contrary to the letter and spirit of the Constitution and subversive to the whole theory upon which the Union of these States is founded."

-- President Franklin Pierce's 1854

"I cannot undertake to lay my finger on that article of the Constitution which granted a right to Congress of expending, on objects of benevolence, the money of their constituents."

-- James Madison, 4 Annals of congress 179 (1794)

Third, there’s data out there (I don’t have on hand) that suggest the amount of money given by American’s voluntarily is much higher than given by our government in the form of tax dollars, therefore rending idea of foreign aid unnecessary. These are all legitimate reasons to oppose foreign aid, and none of them require that you hate poor people.

Stupid things people say during debate.

Close to four years ago, I bought a digital voice recorder that I used to record interesting discussions I had with people about controversial topics. I recently took a look at the number of hours I had recorded back then, and it's a little over 35 hours of recordings. I have since stopped recording conversations and can only speculate how many hours it would be if I had a voice recorder my entire life. As I listened through old conversations, I notice themes on what people say and how they respond to different things.

On occasion I'll get into conversations with people who I personally categories as "non-philosophers" or "misologists." Of course this is a harsh thing to be called, but let me explain what I mean when I say this and how I personally identify them.

By "non-philosopher" I don't mean someone who is not a professor or student of philosophy, but rather someone who, by his own statements, reveals his ignorance of logical fallacies or errors in reasoning. By 'ignorance of logical fallacies' I don't mean ignorance of what "ad hominem" is or what a "compositional fallacy" is, but rather does not see them as fallacies. You don't actually have to know what term is used to identify a fallacy to know it's a fallacy.

By "misologists" I mean someone who, by his own statements, reveals a hatred of reasoning altogether. Of course this may not be conscious, but known by what they say.

Obviously all of this might be seen as very condescending of me, but frankly I don't care about that very much.

Here are small lists of 4 highly obnoxious themes found in too many discussions/debates I've had over the years. Anyone who says, or argues, one of these I personally consider a misologists or a non-philosopher.

1. "That's never going to happen"

Often in discussions of politics or philosophy the objection is that a hypothetical situation or thought experiment is not valid or worth considering because it "will never happen." This objection usually will come up when a thought experiment involves wildly bizarre or unlikely circumstances. Here's a small fictional account of what this looks like.

John: David, you see I believe in a kind of democracy where the will of the people rule, and if the will of the people is served that is just.David: All right, but don't you feel that some things are not up to a vote?

John: What do you mean?

David: Well, are you saying that if the great majority of the people voted to kill you, that would be just?

John: That's ridiculous! That's never going to happen.

David: Fine, but if you're position is that it's just for the will of the people to be served, and the people will your death, wouldn't that be just under your view?

John: David, that's just never going to happen.

This objection can only be made by someone who simply does not understand what a thought experiment is and what purpose it fulfills. A thought experiment is a proposal for an experiment that would test a hypothesis or theory but cannot actually be performed due to practical limitations; instead its purpose is to explore the potential consequences of the principle in question. In the case of John's position on democracy and justice, his principle was that it is just if it is the will of the people. If his principle is true and going to be held consistently then the consequence of that would be that it can be just to kill an innocent man. The fact that the circumstances in the hypothetical are bizarre or unlikely is completely irrelevant as to whether or not the principle is true.

One thing to point out is that the essence of all thinking involves considering hypothetical situations - most of which will never occur. Consider for a moment what it actually means to think about something. For example, thinking about whether to go camping in the woods or to the beach. When think about each option, you imagine the circumstances (i.e. the weather and things you may do). In essence you're playing with hypothetical situations in your mind. So it seems that to reject the use of a thought experiment on the grounds that it's "hypothetical" or "never going to happen" is really to reject the idea of thinking altogether, and to reject the idea of thinking altogether amounts to a hatred of reason and philosophy.

2. "Debating this topic is pointless since nobody will change their mind"

Often you'll find that some people will avoid discussing topics of importance or controversy on the grounds that debating it is pointless or not constructive since it's unlikely that either side will change their mind after the discussion. This defense can be found in many forms:

1. Why debate? It's not like you're going to convince him of anything he doesn't believe
2. I have my beliefs, you have yours, and we're not going to convince each

other of anything, so why bother?

I first want to point out that this presupposes that the purpose of debate is to convince your opponent that he is wrong. This is not at all obvious, and you could argue that the purpose or one of the purposes of debate is to test your ideas against others, or to convince an audience member. The truth is that the purpose of debating probably relies on the intention of the debaters, and is not some kind of defined thing.

Second, this seems to suggest that if a debate does not result in someone being convinced then it was not worth having. The notion that a debate is not worth having, or has little to no value if others are not convinced is just false. One can debate for enjoyment, to test his ideas against others, for the audience, or simply because he feels it's important. This objection could be used to argue why the presidential debates are pointless and are not worth having since both parties usually have strong convictions about what is best for the nation.

Third, whether or not someone is convinced immediately after the debate does not mean they will not eventually be convinced. I personally have had many beliefs and ideas of mine changed as the result of debates I had months before, and I probably would have never changed my position on those things if I had not engaged in debate with others. The truth is that false ideas are best exposed by testing them against other ideas in debate. As David Hume said, "Truth springs from argument among friends."

3. "That's just your opinion"

Another common reason people give to justify why it's not worth their time to discuss important or controversial topics is to brush off the discussion as simply "your opinion against mine." The idea is that debating whether or not there ought to be a minimum wage or whether god exists is like debating which ice cream is best; it at the end of the day is just a "matter of opinion."

Opinion - a belief or judgment that rests on grounds insufficient to produce complete certainty

There are three things to say about this. First, pointing out that someone's belief is a matter of opinion is uttering something meaningless since the definition of opinion is almost synonymous with 'belief.' It's like dismissing someone's argument on the grounds that "It's just a bunch of words put together."

Second, what is relevant in debating an issue is not whether or not something is an opinion but the level of evidence or justification for that opinion. Opinions are not all created equal, some may be supported by better reasons.

Third, there are many things that are considered knowledge today that were once opinion: the shape of the earth, the cause of lightning, and what causes illness are a few examples. The shape of the earth, and its position in the universe was at one time a theological issue debated amongst religious people. You could have easily dismissed debating the position of the earth's place in the universe as a "matter of opinion" or "your religious beliefs against mine." The fact that something happens to be an opinion currently has no relevance on whether it may be knowledge in the future, and it's through debating different positions that we can come to understand something is knowledge. So ultimately refusing to take part in a discussion of 'opinions' is refusing in discussing the truth, and refusing to discuss the truth amounts to a rejection of philosophy altogether.

4. "Pressing your beliefs on others"

Some object to debating topics of importance or controversy on the grounds that it's somehow rude or immoral to "press your beliefs on others." The idea is that provided an argument on why something is true amounts to trying to "convert someone" or "cram your beliefs down their throat" and those are both bad things to do.

First, a belief is either true or false. This is a rather simple premise, and is hard to find anyone who disagrees. A belief or set of beliefs can be reduced to statements about the world. When one says "I believe the basket ball is in the closet" one is claiming to belief the statement "the basket ball is in the closet" is true. The statement is true if it corresponds to reality, which is to say, such a statement about the world is true if it 'maps on' to the real world.

There are some though, and they are not hard to find, who will object saying "Those beliefs are true to them" or "We're all right in our own way" and often resort to the Elephant in the room story. In various versions of the tale, a group of blind men (or men in the dark) touch an elephant to try and discover what it is. Each one touches a different part, but only one part, such as the side or the tusk. They then compare notes on what they felt, and learn they are in complete disagreement. The story is used to indicate that reality may be viewed differently depending upon one's perspective. Each blind man says "It's a rope!" or "It's a wall!" the story ends as follows:

"They began to argue about the elephant and everyone of them insisted that he was right. It looked like they were getting agitated. A wise man was passing by and he saw this. He stopped and asked them, "What is the matter?" They said, "We cannot agree to what the thing we're touching is." Each one of them told what he thought it was. The wise man calmly explained to them, "All of you are right. The reason every one of you is telling it differently because each one of you touched the different part. So, actually the elephant has all those features what you all said."

If you find yourself in a conversation on religion with a liberal minded person, you will hear this story many times. It's the "We're all right in our own way" kind of mentality that is more of a preschool "We're all winners!" type of thinking. One blatant flaw in the story is, although each one felt a different part of the same "truth" - they were all wrong! It was NOT a rope, a wall, a tree, it was an Elephant! Each man made false statements about the world, namely that the object they were touching was something other than an Elephant.

2. Holding true beliefs is better than holding false ones.

(one is better off holding true beliefs)

Beliefs translate into actions, and actions effect people. If those beliefs are false, you're almost certainly wasting a lot of time. Consider the belief that the gods require a child sacrifice in exchange for rain this month. If such a belief is true, then it may be justified, if however that belief is false, you're simply killing an innocent child. What people believe matters; it matters only because of the potentially wasteful or harmful implications of those beliefs being false.

3. Helping people in ways that is better for them is good.

If people are better off holding true beliefs, and helping people in ways that is better for them is good, then it follows that helping people hold true beliefs is good. Of course, helping people hold true beliefs can only be done by providing good reasons and argument, which is precisely what 'converting someone' ultimately is. If you agree with premise 1, 2, and 3 you simply can not condemn or criticize someone for making attempts to 'convert the lost.'

Another thing to point out about this defense is not only immoral and cold hearted, but self-refuting. To better understand how this is the case, we must turn to the actual definition for 'convert.'

convert. (v)

1) To change (something) into a different form or properties.

2) To persuade or induce to adopt a particular religion, faith, or belief.

The second definition given is more appropriate given the context. To convert someone is to persuade them into believing whatever proposition is being presented.

persuade. (v)

1) To induce to undertake a course of action or embrace a point of view by means of argument, reasoning, or entreaty.

To be more specific, to 'convert' someone is to persuade them by means of argument and reason. So if you grant the definition of convert, or persuade, any instance where someone attempts to convince someone of a proposition by means of reason or argument is by definition attempting to convert that person. Therefore the very act of telling someone they are rude for attempting to convert others, if followed by reasons like "I think you should not do this for reason X" is by definition an act of persuasion which is what converting someone is! So to convince one that converting others is rude is in itself a form of conversion! The entire complaint is self-refuting.

By: David Campbell
Originally written: 2007

Economic Facts & Fallacies

 

1. PROVING THE CLAIM

TAXES REDUCE INCENTIVES

1. The primary incentive to do X is money.
2. If the amount of money increases then the incentive increases.
3. If the amount of money is decreased then the incentive decreases.
4. Therefore the amount of money offered corresponds to the incentive.

Example in practice

Imagine I offer you $100 to mow my lawn. You mow my lawn. Imagine I offer you $200 the next day to mow my lawn. Would your incentive to mow my lawn increase? Would you be willing to sacrifice more perhaps? (Not go to the movies for example). Imagine I offer you $20. Would your incentive to mow my lawn decrease?

This seems like a trivial and almost obvious point. The answer to all those questions is yes. In a way it's simply describing supply and demand. Of course if all things obviously true were believed, I would not need to write such things as this.

If you accept the premises above and answered yes to the questions in the thought experiment, then it's fair to say that we've established the amount of money offered corresponds to the incentive to do X.

Tax - A charge against a citizen's person or property or activity for the support of government.

A tax basically is forced 'fee' or 'charge' on something. If I were to pay a 50% tax on $100, I would be left with $50. Taxation therefore reduces the value of whatever is being taxed.

Example in practice

Imagine I offer you $100 to mow my lawn. You mow my lawn. Now imagine I offer you $100 to mow my lawn, and the government recently imposed a tax on mowing lawns, the tax is set to 50%. I offer you $100, but you only receive $50. Would you incentive to mow my lawn change?

Again, all of this is quite obvious. The answer is yes. Economically, there's no difference to you whether or not he offers you $100 or $200, what you will actually receive matters. By the same reasoning, economically it makes no difference to the man how much you get, what he actually pays matters.

If you accept the premises above and answered yes to the questions in the thought experiment, then it's fair to say that we've established if the amount of money offered corresponds to the incentive to do X, and if taxation results in the amount of money being offered always being lower, then it's reasonable to conclude that taxes always reduce the incentive to do X.

In summery

5. The primary incentive to do X is money.
6. If the amount of money increases then the incentive increases.
7. If the amount of money is decreased then the incentive decreases.
8. A tax always reduces the amount of money offered to do X
9. Therefore taxes always reduce the incentive to do X


The implication of this simple principle is that when someone offers to tax a good or service, he is by consequence reducing people's incentive to do that service or consume that good.

When all of this is realized, it becomes very interesting to consider how our tax system is levied. Here are some commonly held ideas

1. Tax the "rich"
2. Tax businesses that employ people.
3. Tax large oil companies with windfall profits tax (95% tax after a set amount)
4. Tax capital gains (investment)
5. Tax death

What's even more bizzar is many are in favor of having very high taxes on corporations, and very wealthy people and families. Barack Obama for example is in favor of taxes as high as 39% on individuals making $200k or more, and a family making $250k or more. Now I think it's reasonable to say that in general those who are earning such a high amount are the most productive in the sense that their services or labor is in such high demand. It's also reasonable to assume that in general those who earn such a high amount are the most responsible for employing people. Given those facts it seems odd to reduce people's incentive to remaining productive in the same ways.

Consider Obama's desire to raise the capital gains tax. Obama's was asked about this during a democratic presidential debate with Hillary Clinton.

GIBSON: All right. You have, however, said you would favor an increase in the capital gains tax. As a matter of fact, you said on CNBC, and I quote, "I certainly would not go above what existed under Bill Clinton," which was 28 percent. It's now 15 percent. That's almost a doubling, if you went to 28 percent.
But actually, Bill Clinton, in 1997, signed legislation that dropped the capital gains tax to 20 percent.

OBAMA: Right.
GIBSON: And George Bush has taken it down to 15 percent.
OBAMA: Right.
GIBSON: And in each instance, when the rate dropped, revenues from the tax increased; the government took in more money. And in the 1980s, when the tax was increased to 28 percent, the revenues went down.
So why raise it at all, especially given the fact that 100 million people in this country own stock and would be affected?
OBAMA: Well, Charlie, what I've said is that I would look at raising the capital gains tax for purposes of fairness.

Obama has since considered lowering that figure to 20%, probably due all of the heat he's received from it. In either case, when we consider the principles being discussed this idea seems counter productive. From what I understand, capital gains are gains earned from when a stock is sold. The result of the tax will be a decrease in the incentive to invest, or at the very least invest in risky stocks (stocks of those who are probably just starting out).

2. REFUTING THE CLAIM "CHEAP LABOR HURTS THE US"
Technology Analogy

Imagine there's a manufacturer of toothpaste who currently has 100 people working for him manually putting together the paste & tubes they go into. His current rate of production is say 5,000 tubes of toothpaste a day, his production costs per tube is $10, and he sells them for $15.


Thousands of people every month buy his toothpaste.
Now imagine this man meets an engineer and they discuss business. The engineer talks about inventing a machine that may assist him in his toothpaste business.


Time goes by and the machine is finished. This manufacturer can now produce 50,000 tubes a day at the cost of $1 per tube. Not only does this equate to 10x the amount of production at 1/10th the cost, but the machine can easily be maintained with 10 people.


The manufacturer lays off all 90 of the least productive or needed employees and begins training the remaining 10 how to use the machine and then doubles their pay.

He now can not only provide 10x the amount of toothpaste but now sells it at $2, saving it's customers on average $300 a year.


Is this a good or bad thing? This in summary is the essence of technology. Technology allows human beings to do more things at lower costs. This is undoubtedly a good thing, and could even be said to be the best thing that could ever happen to humanity since it allows us to produce more of what we want and need with less work.


Now let's say this machine was in a different state from the manufacturer. Is this bad? Let's say the machine was in another country. Is it any less good? Now let's say it's not a machine but 1000 workers. Is it now bad?


To those who would say that free trade harms the US or the other country economically is now in a very absurd position, since economically speaking there's no difference between a machine & a person, if the costs and production speed are the same, and there's obviously no logical reason why the distance between the machine and the manufacturer would make this any less good, yet this is exactly what free trade opponents are saying.


It is undoubtedly true that 90 people lost their jobs. Many people who were in the horse & buggy industry lost their jobs when the automobile became less expensive and more people exploited its benefits. Many in the type writer industry lost their jobs with the advent of the personal computer. Yet, all of these changes are good things that have increased the standard of living for everyone.
3. REFUTING THE CLAIM
"NON-MONETARY TRADE DOES NOT INVOLVE PROFIT"

Non-monetary profit

When defending economic freedom, or as some call capitalism, I'm often confronted with the notion that non-monetary trades are not "for profit" but are done because the trade is "fair" or "more fair" then a trade or transaction done for profit.

For example, in discussion with a member of the Socialist Labor Party‎ a part of the conversation on profit, trade, and labor went something like this.

Socialist: The capitalist employer steals the 'true' value of a workers labor by profit. A worker's labor may produce 10 chairs a day but his wage can only buy him 4 chairs. Therefore the workers true labor is 'really' 10 chairs. The capitalist is therefore stealing his real labor for profit.

Me: Of course, if the employer paid the man more or equal to the amount of output there'd be no incentive to hire him. If a worker makes a business $1,000 richer by increasing production, you're not going to pay him $1,500. (I then blabbed about supply & demand etc)

All right, what about if I trade you 2 chairs for your table, and there is no money involved, is that wrong?

Socialist: No. There is no profit involved.

This idea is brought up in many different forms. The idea that a trade, if done with goods or services alone is not for "profit"

The concept of profit of course is the idea that you gain more than you invested, or the idea that you receive/benefit more than you put in. In monetary terms this is when you buy a good at $1 and sell it for $1.50, making a 50cent profit. Of course, we also speak of profit in terms of gaining in any sense. You could say that many profit from education, since what they get from an education is valued far greater than what was lost receiving it – time & energy.

Let's take the case of the man who trades two chairs for one table. This is claimed to be a 'fair' trade not for profit. Why would anyone trade two chairs for a table? The man obviously values the table more than his chairs, and the man must also value the chairs more than his table. Here we have a situation where the objects have a value relative to each man. In each case the value of the good desired is higher than the good being traded for.

Value is not an objective property but rather something that depends on the existence of minds to desire things. Oil has much more value than dog poop, and the reason has nothing to do with the essence of oil but the fact that it has a much higher demand for it – compared to dog poop. Imagine if tomorrow they discover that dog poop can be converted into something your car can run on – the value of dog poop would change. Its change is directly linked to its demand, which is the word used to described how much something is desired. So any notions of "real" value or "objective" value are false and based on a false concept of value. The term "real" value or "objective" value – in the sense that things have value independent minds/desires – is used time and time again in the discussions of economics, often by those trying to argue that profit or capitalism only works if people are suckered into buying something for more than its "real value." Those who argue this simply are clinging to false and emotionally driven intuitions about the concept of value, and simply have not thought it through.

When this trade occurs, the result is that both men are now in possession of something that was deemed more valuable to them. Both men gained more than they lost – they profited. In the same way that someone makes a monetary profit by receiving more money than they put out.
By: David Campbell
Originally written: Monday, September 15, 2008

FreeWill - Principle of Alternative Possibilities

COULD HAVE DONE OTHERWISE?
One of the many claims made by incompatibilists, either it be libertarians or hard determinists, is that if determinism is true, then we could not have done otherwise, and if we could not have done otherwise then we can't be considered free agents, let alone morally responsible for whatever action we do. They argue that given a certain situation, we must have the ability to do something other than what we did. This principle has been titled the "Principle of Alternative Possibilities" (PAP) by the philosopher Harry Frankfurt. [1]

PAP: A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise

This principle at first appears very intuitive, so intuitive that some philosophers have been said to consider it an a prior truth. How can someone be blamed for doing something, if they could not have done otherwise? One thing to point out is, what people who argue this 'could have done otherwise' principle mean is, that in the exact same circumstances one could have chosen differently. By exact same circumstances, we mean same the state of affairs – every event in the cosmos. The same stars burning at the same temperature, the same emotional state of the agent, every position and velocity of every object, even every atom, in the cosmos.
However if determinism is true, then we could not have done otherwise in the sense given above. If the universe we live in is a mechanistic machine governed by uniform laws, as the determinist believes, then given the same circumstances, the same outcome will occur. If God cranked the universe's wheel of time back to 3pm the same events that took place at 4pm will occur. So under the assumption of determinism, we could not have done otherwise. This means that if determinism is true, and the PAP principle is true, then the compatibilist conception fails, since the compatibilist conception of freedom is that we are free and morally responsible in a real sense, even under the assumption that determinism is true.
However the Principle of Alternative Possibilities is false. You can be considered free and morally responsible even if you could not have done otherwise. I will also argue that the concept of an agent doing otherwise or choosing differently in the same circumstances is impossible even under the assumption that determinism is false. Not only this, but I will show that even if we assume an agent can be said to 'do' otherwise, this would only render the agent unfree and by extension not morally responsible for the act.

Is PAP true?

So then, can a person be considered free even if the person could not have done otherwise? Harry Frankfurt has argued a person can, and does so with a thought experiment that takes many forms. His exact argument can be found in his original essay, but the variations will do. The thought experiment goes as follows:

"Bob passionately wants to kill the president, and plans to do so when he comes and speaks in his hometown on Monday. A fringe political group discovers this, and has an invested interest in the president being dead. The night before the president's speech, the group kidnaps Bob and plants a neural-disruption chip in his brain. If Bob has second thoughts, and decides against killing the president, the chip will activate and in turn cause him to kill the president. Bob wakes up, and kills the president. The chip never activated."

The question is - did Bob kill the president voluntarily, of his freewill? It seems obvious he did. Would he be considered morally responsible for what he has done? Again, yes. Could he have done otherwise? No. The moment that he would have had second thoughts which would have altered his course of action, the chip would have activated rendering him unable to not kill the president. The mere presence of the chip prevented the possibility of doing otherwise, yet he's considered morally responsible for what he did. Now, if he had second thoughts, and the chip was activated then of course he could not be considered free in his assassination. Now some may object to this thought experiment on the grounds that a chip like that may never exist making it cute at best, but nothing of a real challenge to the truth of PAP. There are more down to earth versions. Consider the following:

"Imagine that while Bob is driving, he sees Paul starting to cross the road ahead of him. Bob decides that he does not want to slow down for Paul, and continues on at the same speed. Paul, who is unable to get out of the way of Bob's car, is run over. As a result, Paul is killed instantly.

Assuming that Bob is a rational and sane human being, it seems clear-cut that he is morally responsible for what he did. Now imagine that, unbeknownst to Bob, the road that he was traveling on was covered in ice. Due to the ice, even if Bob had tried to stop the car from hitting Paul, he would not have been able to and Paul would have been killed anyway. Let us further imagine that Bob does not try to stop the car. It seems that we would still want to hold Bob responsible for what he did even though he would have run Paul over regardless of whether or not he hit his brakes. If Bob had hit his brakes, then one might argue that he would not be morally responsible for what he did. However, the fact of the matter is that Bob did not hit his brakes. It seems, then, that Bob is morally responsible for what he did even though he could not have done otherwise."

It seems that the ability to do otherwise is somewhat irrelevant. It seems that what matters is that the person at hand was aware of what's going on, and acted on his desires. In both cases, these men would be considered morally responsible because they were quite aware of what they were doing, and of course they wanted to do what they did.

The Principle of Alternative Possibilities states that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. However, this is not necessarily the case as shown by Frankfurt. It seems there may be other conditions that must be met for a person to possess freewill.

Doing otherwise?

As explained above, some argue that 'do otherwise' means 'could have chosen different under the same circumstances.' Not just similar circumstances, but the exact same circumstances, and not similar times but at the same time. This means that when the golfer misses the put and says "Ah, I could have made that" and picks the ball up, placing it in the same position, in order to simulate the circumstances, he's not actually 'doing otherwise' in this sense. All factors must be the same, the same stars burning at the same temperature, the same emotional state of the agent, every position and velocity of every object, even every atom, in the cosmos. This is one of the conditions that must be met for the CD (could done otherwise) principle. Another condition is that "I could" or "you could" have done otherwise. In other words, doing otherwise means choosing otherwise, there must be a connection between the act and the agent.

Let's first sketch what 'doing' looks like (choice making).

Richard is driving to his friend David's house which is out of town. As he drives down the road, he encounters a fork in the road where he has two options. The path on the left (A) is a little faster but has an 'under construction' sign, whereas the path on the right (B) takes longer but is construction free. As Richard drives along he thinks back on his last trip to David's where he decided to take the faster path, but as a consequence ran over a large screw which resulted in a flat tire. Richard then decides to take the longer, but safer, path.

This is simple, but what actually happened? What events took place? How can this event be broken down? First we have Richard the agent. An agent is a being with intentions and goals. Not only is he an agent, but he is a person. Richard is the totality of his character, beliefs and desires.
Second Richard's driving is for the sake of some goal, namely to arrive at his friends. This means all his actions are corresponding to a desired end. Richard encounters the fork in the road. Data from the world travels to Richard's eyes and eventually to his mind. After this happens an extremely fast and complicated set of processes begin. After the light travels to his Occipital Lobe (the part of the mind that deals with vision), each object is recognized (road, sign etc) and associated with certain meanings. With the available data he then reasons on what action corresponds best to the goal. Since there are two options that best correspond to the goal, he then produces a virtual future for each course of action where he reasons what each action will entail. He taps into his memory of the last visit and remembers what occurred when path A was taken. Path (A) entails he will reach his desired goal faster, but with the risk of getting a flat. Path (B) entails him reaching his desired goal slower, but with the benefit of not getting a flat. With the two virtual futures in his mind, he then selects which of those virtual futures he wants to make an actual future. After all of this is reasoned out, he makes the choice of taking path B.
A voluntary action (doing) can be therefore reduced to: An agent receives input from the world, examines acquired data, reasons through what possible actions entail (ie: producing virtual futures), selects which virtual future best corresponds to the goal, and eventually acts rendering the virtual future an actual future.
The fundamental aspect of this process that makes the act Richard's 'doing' and not the act of someone else, or something else is that there is a real connection between which future is actualized and Richard himself. Which future is actualized is determined by Richard's character along with his goals.
Now lets say 10 minutes after Richard chose path B, we were to 'rewind' time so to speak to the same time in the same circumstances. If determinism is true, then the same outcome of course will occur. All variables will be the same, Richard's emotional state, what's in his field of vision, the position of his head etc. Richard with the same goals, same state of mind, will of course choose path B. What conditions are required for him to do otherwise in the same circumstances? First let's consider what conditions are required for not him doing otherwise, but just the otherwise part – the part where something other or something different can occur at time t under the same state of affairs.
If the cosmos is uniform in its behaviors governed by laws that in some sense are eternal and unchanging, then determinism is a logical consequence. The only condition that must be the case for determinism to be false is to invoke random events. Random being either uncaused or in some sense 'in principle unpredictable' events. This appears to be the only option, since if the cosmos is uniform in it's behaviors, the only way a different outcome is possible is if you change one of the variables, however once some variable is changed it's no longer the exact same circumstances, but a variation of those circumstances. Imagine we rewind time to time t (time t being a specific time), and let everything play out. If you are to allow for some kind of random or uncaused event, imagine say 10 atoms freak out and change their course, then a different outcome is possible.
Let us now apply this to the aspect of doing otherwise. Again PAP states that a person can only be considered free or morally responsible if he could have done otherwise in the same circumstances. The important part is not whether a different outcome is possible at time t but that an outcome is different by virtue of the agent doing. In our example with Richard picking a path, we have many steps of the way. We have Richard receiving input from the world, examining acquired data, reasoning through what possible actions entail (ie: producing virtual futures), selecting which virtual future best corresponds to the goal, and eventually acts rendering the virtual future an actual future. The part that can be said to be 'the act of doing' is when Richard selects the virtual, or imagined, futures causing his future actions (moving his arms, etc.) to be in correspondence to the goal. This of course can be further reduced to events going on inside the brain. Richard's character, his beliefs, desires, memories, etc. all are stored in his brain, and play a role in which path he chooses. All of this exists by virtue of a huge nexus of neurons communicating with each other via electric impulse.

If we are to imagine what is required to change which course of action Richard took at time t, via the use of a random/uncaused event, then we'll no doubt discover it to be some event in the brain. One of the events in the long chain of events must be 'randomized' for him to do otherwise.

The main events are: (1) an agent receives input from the world, (2) examines acquired data, (3) reasons through what possible actions entail (ie: producing virtual futures), (4) selects which virtual future best corresponds to the goal, and eventually acts rendering the virtual future an actual future. The red represents mentally produced events, or mental events.

Richard is at the fork in the road, and all the events listed above are taking place. Now imagine a few of the signals traveling in Richard's brain, say from the part of his mind that contains memories to another part, are disrupted due to a random event causing them to travel to another part of his mind, or to stop traveling altogether. (Keep in mind this is exactly what is required for PAP to work) Richard then ends up still picking path B but turning his steering wheel one inch more to the right than before at time t. Although in a technical sense he did do otherwise since Richard did something different in the same circumstances, but what most supporters of PAP really mean is that a person can make an entirely different choice.

What would it take for Richard to choose path A, or another path? In our thought experiment above we imagined that a few signals were disrupted, but it's been estimated that the human brain contains between eighty five - one hundred billion neurons (85,000,000,000 – 100,000,000,000) so we'll certainly need more than a few connections to be disrupted for an entirely different 'choice' to come out. Let's assume that Richard made the choice on his own, without the intervention of indeterminism, puts 12 billion neurons to use. It seems that to alter the path Richard chooses, we'll have to disrupt at least half of those connections.

The problem here is, random or uncaused events can not be attributed to Richard. If during Richard's reasoning process, a random indeterministic event occurs, resulting in a different outcome from time t, then it no longer is true the choice is the result of Richard. You could not attribute the doing to Richard since the doing is the result of random events. This problem that arises when you attempt to invoke indeterminism to save freewill has been pointed out by the philosopher Daniel Dennett responding to the philosopher Robert Kane:

"The problem is compounded for Kane, since he has to figure out some way to get the undetermined quantum event to be not just in you but yours. He wants above all for the decision to be "up to you," but if the decision is undetermined - the defining requirement of libertarianism - it isn't determined by you, whatever you are, because it isn't determined by anything. Whatever you are, you can't influence the undetermined event - the whole point of quantum indeterminacy is that such quantum events are not influenced by anything. [...] But in order to do this, there has to be more to you than just some mathematical point, you have to be someone; you have to have thoughts - memories, plans, beliefs, and desires - that you've acquired along the way..."

Daniel Dennett - Freedom Evolves: pg – 123

The Principle of could done otherwise states that we can only be free if we could have done otherwise, however for there to even be a 'do otherwise' there must be a do-er responsible for the otherwise – as we have seen the only possible condition for 'otherwise' is to invoke random or uncaused events. When random or uncaused events are introduced then the link between the do-er and the otherwise is lost. Statements such as "Richard choose path B" presuppose that there's a connection between the agent and the choice, there must be a causal connection, a real connection, between the agent and the choice otherwise the agent is not responsible for the doing. So on closer examination the statement "You're only free if you could have done otherwise" in the senses listed at the top of the chapter entails a contradiction, since one can only be considered a the 'do-er' if what was 'done' was directly linked to the 'do-er' and not the result of random events.

Thus, PAP entails the impossible. It's impossible in short because for an agent to 'do' is only possible under determinism, and 'otherwise' (in the senses above) is only possible under indeterminism.

Don't blame me, I did otherwise!
So far I have argued that not only is PAP false, but entails somewhat of a contradiction. Here I will argue that even if we grant 'doing otherwise' is possible, it would only render the agent not responsible for the action. As said above, if the action is the result of random events this severs the connection between agent and choice. A consequence of this is that the agent can't possibly be held responsible for what occurred. An interesting thought experiment has been published by the historian Richard Carrier. Although the quote is pertaining to libertarian freewill, it touches on the PAP principle in the sense of doing otherwise in the exact same circumstances.

"Image two parallel universes, identical in every detail, and imagine a man in each universe, identical in their character, knowledge, desires and everything else, standing in totally identical circumstances. Now imagine that one of these men chooses to kill his wife, but the other man chooses not to. What could possibly explain this? Since the two situations and the two men are identical in every respect, there can be no cause whatsoever for either man's choice. This is what Moreland's theory entails.

But this has an unacceptable consequence. For it means that neither these men's desires, nor their knowledge, nor their moral character - nothing at all - can be blamed for having caused their choice. Moreland even agrees: "no description of our desires, beliefs, character, or other aspects of our makeup and no description of the universe prior to and at the moment of our choice...is sufficient to entail that we did it" (138-9). But this means that we could not even say that the first man was evil and the second good, since that would assume the first man's badness caused him to kill, while the other man's goodness caused him to refrain. But these men are identical, so one cannot be evil and the other good. Moreland might say he is evil or good after the deed, but that means we could not say he did what he did because he was a good or bad man. In fact, we could not say at all why he acted. What quality in either man that is uniquely a part of "him" can be blamed for causing his particular choice? There is none.

Now imagine that this man is you, and in one universe you kill your wife, in the other you do not. What would you think of yourself then? You would know that nothing causes your actions - not your character, nor your environment, nor the surrounding circumstances, nor your knowledge, not even your love of your wife. Nothing. Your choice to kill or refrain is purely a result of happenstance: whichever the universe you are in is a mere luck of the draw. Imagine how you would feel, having learned that it is nothing but the result of unpredictable randomness whether you kill your wife or not at this very moment. Shocking, yes? Imagine that you refrain from killing, but could step into a time machine, run the universe back a million times, and watch yourself again each time, and then saw that sometimes you killed and sometimes you didn't, even though each time all the circumstances including your thoughts, desires, character, everything were the same. There would be no rhyme or reason to why you did this one or the other. It would be a mere shake of the dice. This is the nightmare of a world that Moreland's theory describes." - Richard Carrier - A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism

If we could do otherwise, it would most probably be like having Tourettes Syndrome. Having no control over our actions, being the victims of the random, and being reduced to uncontrollable random machines. Thomas Pink has mentioned this issue with conceptions of freewill that rely on indeterminism

"There is yet another problem that faces the libertarian. Is libertarian freedom something we could ever exercise, in the only way that freedom ever can be exercised, though what we deliberately do, in genuine and intelligible action? Libertarian freedom seems to reduce what we do to no more than blind, undirected motion – to the equivalent to jerks and spasms." Thomas Pink - Free Will: A Very Short Introduction – pg 83

What do we mean?
Some of those reading this may be convinced in what has just been said, and some of you may already be familiar with the topic and had been convinced long ago – yet some of us will continue to say 'sorry, I could have done it but…' or 'I could have done otherwise' casually in our daily lives. It rolls of the tongue, and we mean something when we say it. What do we actually mean? Sometimes language can be a difficult thing to get around in discussions of philosophy, and getting a clear understanding on what words mean, and what we mean should be an important goal when we consider certain ideas. The principles that have been talked about above have dealt with doing something different in the same circumstances at the same time, yet on closer examination we discover that in practice we run into trouble, yet we will continue use that kind of language.
Is it possible we mean something incoherent? An interesting example of this might be the idea of changing the future. You'll hear politicians say it all the time – "Let's change the future!" – change the future? From what to what? The future is what will happen, what are you going to change? That may not be a good example, since one just a moment of reflection we discover that what people are really getting at is the idea of changing the anticipated future. If things are to continue as they are now, then we ought to expect X, thus changing how things are now will alter what we are to expect. Another possible example is the idea of having a mind - or more specifically the statement "I have a brain." Our scientific understanding of the mind is that it is the manifestation of a kind of brain. The self in a way resides in the mind, which is the product of the brain. So to say "I have a brain" is somewhat like saying "my brain has a brain." Some have even argued that we have a cognitive dispassion to divide the world into two kinds of things – minds and objects. So notions of a disembodied self come so natural that we find our self speaking in a way that presupposes the truth of dualism. Another possibility, one that I have speculated on, is that since the great majority of our ancestors held certain religious or superstitious views, our language and way of speaking naturally reflects that.
What I think we may mean when we say such things is not that we could have done differently given the exact circumstances, but rather, we could have done otherwise if we had known better. We could have done otherwise if we had chosen differently. That's utterly uncontroversial, since it's quite obvious that different outcomes are entail by different circumstances. So could it be that all we're really saying is "If I knew what I know now, I would have done differently" or "If I had chosen differently, I would have done differently" – It's hard to say.
1. Harry Frankfurt, "Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility," in Free Will, ed.
Gary Watson ( Oxford Univerity Press, 2003), 167.
2. Shariff, G.A. 1953. Cell counts in the primate cerebral cortex. J. Comp. Neurol. 98:381–400

By: David Campbell
Originally written: Sunday, June 10, 2007

It sure does not feel like it!

When some people discover the mechanistic or scientific explanations for certain things pertaining to a human experience, some will have an intuitive form of skepticism. You will often hear something to the effect that "Fine, but it does not feel as though X is the result of Y." X being some kid of experience, such as the experience of love, the experience of consciousness, or the experience and conviction that we posses freewill. Y being some kind of natural process or material process.

The argument often goes as follows:

David: It's pretty much universally agreed, by scientists at least that subjective experience is a consequence of a kind of physical brain. All kinds of things support the idea that a physical brain is required for subjective experience -- like the fact that alcohol and other physical substances can change our conscious states, that degenerative brain diseases such as Alzheimer's or physical injuries can seriously impair or even destroy conscious states, and the fact that we don't expect young children to be capable of the types of abstract reasoning that require more fully developed brains. So the idea that we need immaterial souls or whatnot to account for our minds, at least at the moment, is ad hoc.

Gatlin: I see. That may be true, but I still can't overcome my conviction that all of this subjective experience I feel is something above and beyond just matter in motion. It just does not feel as though consciousness is the result of 'just' physical processes going on in my brain. It feels like there's something going on that's immaterial.

There are many examples where this kind of 'from the gut' argument is made. In the context of accounts for love, spiritual experience, freedom, awareness. The argument is never an argument using some kind of objective measure, but rather an argument from experience, an argument from conviction. I think this kind of reasoning may be a mistake, at least in the context of trying to explain certain experiences. I'll begin making my case after a quote reportedly from Wittgenstein

"Wittgenstein: Tell me," he asked a friend, "why do people always say it was natural for man to assume that the Sun went round the Earth, rather than that the Earth was rotating?"

His friend replied, "Well, obviously because it just looks as though the Sun is going round the Earth."

And Wittgenstein replied, "Well, what would it have looked like, if it had looked as though the Earth was rotating?"

It's interesting to consider this. What would it look like if the earth was rotating, and not the sun? It obviously, would look exactly the same. We could ask the same question to the skeptic who asserts that it does not feel like love is a natural thing, or that consciousness is physically possible. What would it feel like if love was a natural thing? What would it feel like if subjective experience was the result of only a physical brain? Would we 'feel' the atoms responding appropriately? Would we go "All right, now based on the situation, I should be feeling high levels of dopamine and norepinephrine and probably low levels of serotonin, oh boy here it comes! Aw, I love you!" What would a naturalistic/compatibilist notion of freewill feel like? Could we 'feel' our thoughts if the physicalist notion of the mind is true?

The main issue with this is, to claim that it would feel differently if our minds were 'physically possible' presupposes some type of way of comparing the two, and unless God grants us access to two different universes where love is magic and then love is natural, we have no way of possibly knowing. It's not as though we're talking about petting a dog, and someone claims that this dog has no hair. It's clear we could say something to the effect that it would feel like something else to pet a bald dog. Of course a bald dog and a furry dog are something that can be compared. So it seems such a statement could never be epistemicaly justified.

When I encounter a person like the hypothetical character as Gatlin, I find it fun to reverse the argument. "That's fine" I would reply "It just feels so much like my mind is the result of a physical brain." – I'm at least justified in saying that, although I may not know what it would feel like (assuming it would feel differently) to have a immaterial mind, I'm least am pretty sure what a materially produced mind feels like, since we're certain it's true we have one. Some may claim it feels as though our minds are magical, which leads to the conviction that they are, but like the rotation of the earth, it may be that a physicalist mind feels the same.

By: David Campbell
Originally written: Monday, May 28, 2007